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The expansion and diffusion of mobile phones globally has resulted in the provision of financial 
transactional services over the existing mobile phone platforms, generally referred to as mobile 
money. The supply end of mobile money services is an important factor in the success of the 
financial transactions offering. This research assessed vulnerabilities in the mobile money supply 
network that are inherently related to the existence of the principal – agent problem and their 
implications on availability and access to the services. The research study was conducted using a 
qualitative approach. Qualitative information was collected through interviews guided by open – 
ended questionnaires. Thematic analysis approach was followed to systematically analyse the data 
and generate findings of the study. Agent transactional data was analysed to complement the 
findings from qualitative analysis  
The findings suggest that the principal agent problem permeates the mobile money delivery 
network mainly after businesses joining as agents and manifests as moral hazard. Moral hazard is 
the dominant feature of the principal – agent problem, with adverse selection very low. Drivers of 
moral hazard are demonstrated by the influences and demands of agents’ core businesses and 
challenges in agent monitoring and training. The existence of the principal – agent problem has 
limited or no implications on access and availability of services. However, overtime the combined 
vulnerabilities identified related to the principal agent problem are likely to manifest into risks that 
are likely to affect access and availability of mobile money services.  
Regulators, Mobile Network Operators and agent enterprises must collectively review monitoring 
approaches for mobile money service providers to address challenges identified and increase the 
effectiveness of monitoring. Service provision standards should be reviewed to suit the various 
business environments the services are provided within. Mobile Network Operators and agent 
enterprises need to institute stronger partnership arrangements that enhance ownership and 
obligations for all parties, in particular agent enterprises. Agreements must enable application of 
different mobile money delivery models suitable to meet the demands and requirements of the 
agents’ core businesses. Innovations such as Near Field Communication (NFC) can be integrated 
with Point of sale (POS) applications and mobile money platforms to reduce the administration 
burden on agents and human error. Such applications must consider the cost implications of 
adoption from the agents’ business perspective.  
Key words: principal agent problem, relationship/network structure, agent performance, service 
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1.1 Research Area 
The expansion and diffusion of mobile phones globally has resulted in the provision of financial 
transactional services over the existing mobile phone platforms. The ability for people to use 
and access financial services using mobile phones has been regarded by some as a victory for 
financial inclusion, in particular for the poor. Boateng and Duncombe (2009) note that current 
literature hypothesizes that mobile phones have the potential to become low cost accessible 
accounts or delivery channels for financial services, in particular electronic money and mobile 
banking.  Boateng and Duncombe (2009) note that there exists an inherent need by the poor for 
low – cost financial services that could be delivered by the mobile phone. Dermish, Kneiding, 
Leishman & Mas (2012), further note that mobile payments or branchless banking have become 
a key catalyst for financial inclusion; and make use of agents to penetrate areas where the poor 
live and work. 
 
The recognition of mobile phones as a key catalyst for financial inclusion is largely driven by 
the success of M – PESA in Kenya. M – PESA was introduced by SAFARICOM in Kenya in 
2007. According to Mas and Morawczynski (2009), M – PESA saw exceptional growth since 
its inception in March 2007. Mas and Morawczynski (2009) note that 6 million customers 
registered with the service, which represented nearly half the customer base of SAFARICOM. 
Use of M – PESA for financial transactions was also high with over $1.6 billion worth of person 
to person transfers made over M – PESA (Mas and Morawczynski, 2009).  
 
In 2012 Vodacom Lesotho had 1 million subscribers which is 80% share of the mobile 
communication market in Lesotho. M – PESA services were introduced in July 2013 and as at 
May 2016; there were 704 900 registered customers, with 256 600 actively using the service. 
The total value of transactions cumulative since July 2013 is over LSL67 million. 
 
The M – PESA distribution network is hierarchical and consists of Super – Agents and Agents. 
Super – Agents are at the higher tier and are responsible for management of agents at the lower 
tier. Super – Agents and Lower – Tier Agents are existing entities operating their own 
businesses. M – PESA Lesotho has a total of 1,999 agents, and includes 15 super – agents of 
which only 7 are active. There is no fixed number of Lower – Tier Agents that Super – Agents 




Agents to recruit and manage agents. Vodacom also acts as a Super – Agent with Lower – Tier 
Agents under its management. Vodacom has a set of requirements that business entities must 
meet in order to be part of the M – PESA network.    
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The supply end of mobile money services is an important factor in the success of the financial 
transactions offering. Duncombe (2009) indicates that delivery of m – payment services entails 
both availability of the services and access to them. According to Beshowi and Gravrak (2010), 
in order to get mobile money to the market, operators need a distribution network that can take 
in and dispense cash from accounts. This is the case for M – PESA where the mobile network 
operator relies on the existing retail network to act as M – PESA agents to dispense the cash – 
in and cash – out services to customers. The mobile operator delegates or outsources the 
services to various retail entities that include local general dealers, supermarkets, filling stations 
etc.  
 
Duncombe (2009) indicates that a success factor of M – PESA was that it utilised a network of 
existing agents to facilitate cash – in and cash – cash out services that were licensed to act on 
behalf of a trusted entity. Apart from the basic cash in – cash out transactions, the mobile money 
platform also has value added services such as payments for utility bills, purchases in – store 
etc. M – PESA is therefore an ecosystem that has a number of stakeholders that add and extract 
value from it through the different roles that they undertake within it. Lal and Sachdev (2015) 
emphasise the agent network as an essential component of mobile money services and indicate 
that usage of mobile money services drops if there are no cash – in and cash – out locations in 
close proximity to customers, and if agents are not accessible at times convenient for customers.  
 
The structure of the M – PESA delivery network, particularly its hierarchical nature 
demonstrates existence of a principal – agent relationship. However, this relationship is 
complex as it consists of multiple principals and agents. The mobile network operator is the 
main principal for all agents and acts as Super – Agent in some cases; and Super – Agents act 
as principals of Lower – Tier Agents under their management. Aron (2015) indicates that 
mobile money systems rely on a network of agents linked under various contractual 
arrangements with a parent Mobile Network Operator and that the nature of these agent network 
structures and the design of the individual agent contracts is important for the successful 




The configuration of the M – PESA delivery network suggests the potential existence of the 
principal – agent problem in the network. The problem is likely to permeate the network 
through two possible channels (a) at the point of agent recruitment by the principal into the 
network and (b) within the network as part of service provision by agents and management of 
the network by the principal.   
 
Eisenhardt (1989) indicates that the agency problem arises when (a) the desires or goals of the 
principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what 
the agent is actually doing i.e. the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved 
appropriately. Eisenhardt (1989) further notes that the problem arises when the principal and 
agent have different attitudes towards risk i.e. the principal and agent may prefer different 
actions because of the different risk preferences. 
 
The potential, success and failure of mobile money has been widely discussed (Radcliffe and 
Mas 2011; Jack and Suri 2011; Mas and Morawczynski 2009 and Porteus 2007). However, 
these discussions did not assess the complex relationship structure inherent in mobile money 
from a principal – agent problem perspective, the likely vulnerabilities to the delivery network 
as a result of the relationship structure and their implications on the availability and access to 
the services.  
 
1.3 Purpose and Significance of the Research 
The research envisaged to identify vulnerabilities in the mobile money supply network that are 
inherently related to the existence of the principal – agent problem. These vulnerabilities may 
be construed as contributory factors to some of the failures of mobile money, and provide an 
explanation for the high numbers of registered M – PESA users versus the lower numbers of 
active users.  
 
The research was important for mobile money service providers as it makes available further 
insight of the potential risks or vulnerabilities inherent in the delivery system as a result of the 
structure adopted and the different actors involved. The research contributes to the 






1.4 Research Questions and Scope 
The research aimed to answer the following questions: 
 
a. How and to what extent does the principal – agent problem manifest itself in the mobile 
money service delivery network? 
 
b. What are the implications of the principal – agent problem on availability and access to 
mobile money services? 
 
The objective of the research was to identify principal – agent problem vulnerabilities in the 
mobile money service delivery structure and how the vulnerabilities are likely to affect 
availability and access to mobile money services.  
 
1.5 Research Assumptions 
For purposes of this research the following assumptions were made: 
 The principal – agent problem vulnerabilities apply in mobile money services regardless of 
the business model adopted. 
 
 The Vodacom officials and M – PESA agents interviewed are knowledgeable on the issues 
to be investigated in this study and will be able to provide accurate and reliable information. 
 
 The information collected and analysed was sufficient evidence that enabled realistic 
conclusions to be made on the questions investigated in this study. 
 
 Mobile money service providers, in particular mobile network operators will find value in 









This section presents an overview of the mobile money industry in Lesotho for the period 2012 
to 2015. Details on the structure of the industry, trends in performance indicators and future 
prospects are provided in this section.  
 
2.2 Mobile Telephone Sector in Lesotho 
The mobile phone sector is dominated by two Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), namely 
Econet Telecom Lesotho (ETL) and Vodacom Lesotho (VCL). ETL was established through a 
merger between Telecom Lesotho and Econet Ezi ~ Cel Lesotho in April 2008 while VCL is a 
subsidiary of Vodacom South Africa and began operating in Lesotho in 1996. According to the 
Lesotho Telecommunications Authority (LCA) (2014), the mobile subscribers reached a total 
of 1,753,323 in 2014, from 1,580,713 reported in the previous year. LCA (2014) notes that this 
translates into a teledensity of approximately 93% of the population, with 98% as prepaid 
subscribers and 2% post – paid subscribers. LCA (2014) indicates that mobile subscribers 
accounted for 97% of telecommunication market share compared to fixed subscribers at 3%. 
Figure 1 shows the mobile sector teledensity trends over a period of ten years from 2004 to 
2014. According to LCA (2014) the geographic coverage area with access to communications service 
also increased as a result of by mobile services.  
 





Source: Lesotho Communications Authority Annual Report 2013 – 2014 
2.3 Mobile Money Regulation 
Lesotho does not have a regulatory framework to regulate mobile money financial services, and 
has instead put in place interim provisions. The Central Bank of Lesotho supervises mobile 
money services through Mobile Money Guidelines specifically developed for Mobile Network 
Operators. The Mobile Network Operators operate mobile money services on the basis of a 
Letter of No Objection from the Central Bank of Lesotho. The Mobile Money Guidelines enable 
the Mobile Network Operators to maintain standards on financial services such as anti – money 
laundering and customer balance protection requirements. Important to highlight is that the 
Guidelines prohibit “exclusivity” arrangements with agents, i.e. if one MNO signs up an agent 
it cannot prevent the same agent from working for a different service provider. Prohibiting 
exclusivity is important as it promotes competition and enables participation of agents in both 
mobile money offerings, especially in rural areas with fewer agents. The Government of 
Lesotho envisages to introduce comprehensive legislation on payment systems that will include 
the regulation of mobile money services and replace the current Mobile Money Guidelines.  
 
2.4 The Mobile Money Sector in Lesotho 
There are two major mobile money service providers in Lesotho. Econet Telecom Lesotho 
launched its mobile money service, Ecocash, in October 2012 while VCL launched M – Pesa 
in July 2013. In December 2015, M – Pesa had signed up to 745,242 customers with 1999 
agents. On the other hand, Ecocash accumulated 318,786 customers and 1480 agents 
countrywide during the same period. The number of registered mobile money customers in 
Lesotho increased since its introduction in October 2012. According to the Central Bank of 
Lesotho (2015), based on 2006 population census figure of 1,880,661 inhabitants, the number 
of registered mobile money customers increased from 10% in June 2013 to approximately 57% 
of the population in December 2015. The Central Bank of Lesotho (2015) indicates that the 
number of agents increased exponentially from 337 in June 2013 to 3654 in December 2015. 
Figure 2 indicates the number of registered mobile money customers and agents in Lesotho 










Figure 2: Number of Registered Mobile Money Customers and Agents 
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho 2015 
 
 
The Central Bank of Lesotho (2015) further notes that as a proportion of Mobile Network 
Operators’ subscribers, the two Mobile Network Operators achieved approximately 48% 
market penetration in December 2015 as indicated in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: Number of Subscribers and Mobile Money Users during April 2014 – 2015 (in 
thousands) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho 2015 
 
2.5 Agent Network Structure and Distribution  
The Mobile Network Operators have established agent networks consisting mostly of retail 




to balance e – money and cash. The majority of mobile money agents are located in urban 
districts with few operating in rural districts. This urban bias as noted by the Central Bank of 
Lesotho (2015) is attributed to failure by Mobile Network Operators to reach remote areas as a 
result of lack of customer education and inaccessibility of some rural areas located in the 
country’s mountainous terrain. Figure 4 shows the number of agents operating in the 10 districts 
of Lesotho. 
 
Figure 4: Agent Network per District (Number of Agents per district) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho 2015 
 
2.6 Mobile Money Performance  
Since the introduction of mobile money services, transaction volumes, especially customers’ 
withdrawals, bill payments, domestic money transfers and airtime purchases, have maintained 
an upward trend consistent with the increasing market penetration. The Central Bank of Lesotho 
(2015) indicates that as of December 2015, mobile money processed 751,743 airtime purchases, 
243,169 customer cash withdrawals, 321,768 bill payments and 221,257 domestic money 











Figure 5: Volume of Mobile Money Transactions (in thousands) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho 2015 
 
The Mobile Money Guidelines prescribe that all customer balances on the mobile money 
system (e – value) must be backed in full by a deposit in a trust account in the name of the 
MNO (or subsidiary of the MNO) at a licensed bank. Since the inception of mobile money 
services in Lesotho, the trust account balances of Econet and Vodacom increased considerably 
and this is consistent with the high uptake and usage of mobile money as previously indicated. 
Figure 6 indicates the growth of trust account balances from 2013 to 2015. 
 
Figure 6:  Trust Account Balances (in thousand Maloti)   
 
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho 2015 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The uptake and use of mobile money services increased rapidly since inception in 2012 and has 




mobile money services, however this is mainly in urban districts and there is potential for more 
subscribers to use mobile money services in rural areas where the majority of the population 
resides. Mobile Network Operators should put more effort to scale up customer education on 
mobile money and increase the agent footprint in rural areas. Potential exists for upscaling 
transactions with low use such as processing of salaries and Government welfare payments on 
the mobile money platforms, particularly in rural areas which have limited banking 
infrastructure. It is unlikely that banks will expand their financial services infrastructure to rural 
areas because it would not be financially viable. The difficulty of accessing financial services 
by the majority of the rural population creates an opportunity for mobile money to provide a 
solution that is cost effective and financially viable. As a result of the growth in use of mobile 
money services, other non – bank and non – Mobile Network Operators have plans to introduce 
their own mobile money products; and this requires the Government to develop a single 

































3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review section first considers a broad overview of research undertaken in the area 
of mobile money from a perspective of areas covered in the research, methodologies used and 
theories applied. The section then reviews the principal – agent problem and its relevance to 
mobile money services. The last part of this section provides an overview of theoretical 
frameworks that can be applied to assess the principal – agent problem in distribution or supply 
chain networks and their application to investigate the questions advanced by this research 
study.   
 
3.2 The Architecture of the Mobile Money Implementation Models 
This section provides a description of the mobile money ecosystem and the architecture of the 
various mobile money services in use across different countries. The objective is to provide an 
understanding of the key features and mechanisms in mobile money services, and relationships 
between the different features and stakeholders.   
 
3.2.1 Mobile Money Ecosystem 
Lal and Sachdev (2015) refer to an ecosystem as the way in which relationships are 
established/structured and a competitive landscape established. Radcliffe and Mas (2011) 
indicate that mobile money requires stitching together a complex web of actors who collectively 
generate the large volumes of transactions needed to fuel the system. The respective actors 
undertake an important function within the ecosystem. The main actors in the system are Mobile 
Network Operators, banks, airtime resellers, retailers and regulators. Radcliffe and Mas (2011) 
indicate that all these actors must collaborate to ensure that the mobile money ecosystem is 
sustainable and productive.  Radcliffe and Mas (2011) further note that the ecosystem is a big, 
complex undertaking, which involves convincing a range of actors – people, retail shops, 
corporations and governments that enough players will be brought on board. Radcliffe and Mas 








Figure 7: Mobile Money Ecosystem 
 
Source: Flores – Roux and Mariscal 2010 
 
Figure 7 shows the various players and different roles they occupy within the mobile money 
ecosystem. An issue relevant to this research study is the relationships that exist between the 
different players within the ecosystem. The relationships exist as a result of the types of 
business models for mobile money and the roles of each respective player in the ecosystem.  
 
3.2.2   Mobile Money Models 
This section provides an overview of the different mobile money delivery models in operation 
across the world. There are typically four main delivery models in use as indicated by Chaix 
and Torre 2011. 
 
3.2.2.1 The Operator Centric Model 
According to Chaix and Torre (2011) there are many examples of Operator Centric Models 
already available and operational. Chaix and Torre (2011) indicate that in this case, the 
telecommunication operator offers the technology, operates the transactions and compensates 
the system. Chaix and Torre (2011) note that before payments, there is a necessity to connect 
the m – payment system and banking accounts or cash deposits. Chaix and Torre (2011) further 
note that after the clearing of the last transactions, there is the same necessity to credit the 
accounts or to pay in cash the last recipients. At this level, a third party must provide the 
liquidity to the system and be compensated by the operator (Chaix and Torre, 2011). This third 




cases where the model is an operator centric model (Chaix and Torre, 2011). An illustration of 
this model is attached in Appendix A. 
 
Chaix and Torres (2011) state that the operator develops and deploys applications for this 
service. Chaix and Torres (2011) indicate that the adoption of this mode of payment by retailers 
and consumers is however not immediate. Potential users may be afraid of the different risks 
that they associate to the system (possibility of fraud, blow to privacy). Adoption costs also 
integrate material fixed costs (adaptation to the new technology, time to accept operators as 
financial partners) incurred by retailers, clients and finally the operator which could be involved 
to differ adoption until their decrease (Chaix and Torre, 2011). The M – PESA mobile money 
delivery model which is the focus of this research study is an example of the Operator Centric 
Model. 
 
3.2.2.2 The Bank Centric Model 
According to Chaix and Torre (2011), this model is less frequent than the operator model, 
probably because operators have two advantages over banks: (i) they hold the technology and 
particularly the secure element and (ii) they usually frequently compete with a few number of 
partners. Chaix and Torre (2011) note that on the other hand, banks generally face a very 
different environment, and have many competitors and do not hold the technology. They must 
compete or more successfully cooperate with other financial partners and collaborate with 
mobile operators without any substantial bargaining advantage (Chaix and Torre, 2011). The 
Bank Centric Model can be considered as an evolution of the credit card model as users 
(households or firms) are in relation with their bank which provide them the way of payment 
(the mobile-phone) (Chaix and Torre, 2011). The users receiving the payments (frequently 
commercial intermediaries) are not generally clients of the same bank than the payer (Chaix 
and Torre, 2011). Chaix and Torre (2011) indicate that a general compensation system must 
then operate between banks with or without connections with the classic inter –bank flows; and 
that the partners’ banks of this compensation system must also pay fees to one or many mobile 
operators associated to the operation. An illustration of this model is attached in Appendix A. 
 
3.2.2.3 The Independent Service Provider Model 
Chaix and Torre (2011) indicate that in this model a third party, distinct from a financial agent 




final users. Chaix and Torre (2011) note that this new actor concentrates all the organizational 
prerogatives held by banks or operators in the previously presented models. The independent 
service provider (ISP) manages the distribution of property rights between the operators and 
the banks, which are in this case less decisional in the coordination process (Chaix and Torre, 
2011). Chaix and Torre (2011) indicate that internet companies are the ideal candidates to 
intervene as ISP given their previous experience with monetary transfers and the organization 
of electronic commerce websites. 
 
3.2.2.4 The Collaborative Model 
According to Chaix and Torre (2011), this model involves a collaboration between operators, 
banks and the participation of a third party which creates a link between the two main partners. 
Chaix and Torre (2011) indicate that all partners derive their revenue from fees charged to 
merchants and final users: these different sources of revenue are however still subject of 
disagreements between partners. Chaix and Torre (2011) further note that investment costs 
generally split between banks, operators and sometimes the third party providing an escrow 
service. An inquiry by the Smart Card Alliance shows that the collaborative model is considered 
by 86% of the participants like having the greatest potential for long term propagation (Chaix 
and Torre, 2011).  This model as noted by Chaix and Torre (2011) seems more viable than the 
others because it allows each partner to concentrate on his own skills; with banks concentrating 
on financial responsibility and operators on the transmission network. Chaix and Torre (2011) 
further indicate that this model is then seemingly easier to implement than the other ones 
because each party is in its natural role. The distribution of profits and the management of 
property rights however remains an open problem: it requires to imagine an advanced 
collaborative process requiring a learning period for rather suspicious partners (Chaix and 
Torre, 2011).      
 
An overview of the architecture of mobile money and the various operational models used was 
presented in this section. The different operational models have advantages and limits. This 
study focuses on the operator – centric model and the relationships that exist within it. Chaix 
and Torre (2011) in outlining the advantages of this model indicate that it is probably more 
suited to an economy of cash money: it is adapted to small but distant transactions for which it 
decreases the costs and the risk of transfer. Chaix and Torre (2011) further note that it is 




This model can possibly compensate in an emerging country or in an isolated region with low 
density of bank branches by a new form of financial intermediation without financial agent 
(Chaix and Torre, 2011). 
 
3.3 The Principal Agent Theory 
According to Rao (2003), the Principal Agent theory was originally proposed by Ross (1973), 
and later extended by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Eisenhardt (1989) citing Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Ross (1973), indicates that agency theory broadened risk sharing literature 
to include the agency problem that occurs when cooperating parties have different goals and 
division of labour. Specifically, agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous relationship, in 
which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as cited by Eisenhardt (1989), indicate that agency theory attempts 
to describe this relationship using the metaphor of a contract.  In this context, Eisenhardt (1989), 
indicates that the unit of analysis is the contract governing the relationship between the principal 
and the agent, and the focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient contract 
governing the relationship. Eisenhardt (1989) further notes that the agency theory is concerned 
with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The two agency problems 
outlined by Eisenhardt (1989) arise when: 
(a) The desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict. The problem here is that the 
principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately.   
(b) It is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. 
This is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different 
attitudes towards risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer 
different actions because of different risk preferences. 
 
Rao (2003) indicates that lack of equivalence of information contents between parties to a 
common issue that affects each other’s interests constitutes an informational asymmetry. A 
generalisation of this concept would also include unequal capacities among parties to a common 




content as an input but also its effective contribution to an output or an optimal decision that 
constitutes the essence of asymmetric information (Rao, 2003).  
 
According to Rao (2003), the role of agency cost, in the framework of the Principal Agent 
theory suggests that the agency cost, in the context of financial firms, is often a function of the 
type and extent of informational asymmetry, monitoring and information costs. Rao (2003) 
indicates that an operational definition of the concept, given by Jensen and Meckling (1976, 
p.308) states: 
 
“the agency cost comprises the sum of the monitoring costs by the principal, the costs of 
bonding the agent to perform tasks in conformity with the performance objectives of the 
principal or economic entity, and that of residual losses that are attributable to the divergence 
of the optimal decisions effected by the agents in contrast to those that could have been taken 
by the principal if directly involved in the decisions.” 
 
Rao (2003), indicates that in the formal literature two aspects of the agency problem are cited 
as moral hazard and adverse selection. According to Rao (2003) moral hazard refers to the lack 
of effort on the part of the agent. Rao (2003) indicates that the argument here is that the agent 
may simply not put forth the agreed upon effort. Moral hazard arises ex post, after the decision 
to lend, issue contract or other event, has been arrived at among interacting parties based on 
information until that event (Rao, 2003). Adverse selection as indicated by Rao (2003) refers 
to the misrepresentation of ability by the agent. In this case as noted by Rao (2003), the 
argument here is that the agent may claim to have certain skills or abilities when he or she is 
hired. Adverse selection arises because the principal cannot completely verify these skills or 
abilities either at the time of hiring when the agent is working (Rao, 2003). Rao (2003) indicates 
that adverse selection occurs ex ante in an interaction among parties leading to a lending 
decision, contracting or other event, based on information available at the time of the event. 
 
The different aspects of the principal agent theory were briefly covered in this section. This 
theory and the problems associated with it are an integral part of this study as it aims to examine 




of mobile money due to the structural arrangements and delegation of responsibilities in the 
delivery of mobile money services.  
 
3.4 Mobile Money Research 
Dahlberg, Mallat, Ondrus & Zmijewska (2007) undertook a literature review of 73 publications 
with the aim to summarize findings from past mobile payments research, and to suggest 
promising directions for future research. According to Dahlberg et al (2007) analysis of the 
literature revealed that most of the studies reviewed investigated consumer adoption factors. 
Dahlberg et al (2007) further note that adoption factors seemed especially important in an 
emerging area such as mobile payments. Dahlberg et al (2007) indicate that the research often 
involved traditional acceptance models and was mostly based on the technology acceptance 
model (TAM) and diffusion of innovations model. In this regard, Dahlberg et al. (2007) note 
that technology was the most researched factor with 29 publications, followed by 20 
publications that focused on consumers. Areas with just a few focus of studies as noted by were 
mobile payment services market and providers, merchant power, legal/regulatory and 
standards, as well as new e –payments (Dahlberg et al., 2007). 
 
The above – mentioned findings by Dahlberg et al (2007) clearly demonstrate a gap in mobile 
payments research especially areas focusing on mobile payment services providers and 
merchant power. This research study focused on investigating the relationship dynamics of 
providers and merchant power and implications on the services. Another important aspect of 
this study is the theoretical angle it applies by using the principal agent theory/problem, thereby 
departing from the research based on acceptance models as indicated by Dahlberg et al (2007). 
 
An important factor considered by this research study as highlighted by Dahlberg et al (2007) 
is that only four papers focused exclusively on merchants, and that three of them revealed the 
various barriers to mobile payment adoption by merchants. According to Dahlberg et al (2007) 
barriers such as high costs (transaction fees), complexity (ease of use), lack of relative 
advantage, low compatibility, and the interdependence between consumers and merchants at an 
early stage of development were identified. 
 
These barriers referred to by Dahlberg et al (2007) are important to the investigation of the 
research study on M – PESA as they have potential to influence the actions of Vodacom as the 




research related to merchants and the mobile payments value chain with focus on issues such 
as understanding and analysis of merchants’ expectations and incentives; how merchants can 
best attract customers and other merchants to an existing mobile payment services network; 
competitive impacts of mobile payment services operated by merchants etc. Although the 
research study did not cover the areas proposed by Dahlberg et al (2007), there are elements 
which are relevant to them. Despite indicating specific questions and areas for future research, 
Dahlberg et al (2007) do not propose appropriate theories to base the proposed research on, and 
only indicate the need for quantitative studies.  
 
Duncombe and Boateng (2009) undertook a literature review of 43 m – finance research 
articles. The aim of the review was to identify key research trends and gaps relating to a) 
concepts; b) methodologies; c) issues addressed and questions raised; d) evidence presented; 
and e) future research directions in the area (Duncombe and Boateng, 2009). The review as 
noted by Duncombe and Boateng (2009), revealed research gaps in issues and evidence and 
conceptual approach. Gaps in issues and evidence pointed towards a focus on analysis at the 
macro level dealing with infrastructure and regulatory issues; as well as at the meso level 
dealing with the development of applications and the role of financial and mobile phone 
intermediaries and delivery mechanisms (Duncombe and Boateng, 2009). In relation to gaps in 
conceptual approach, Duncombe and Boateng (2009) note that research related to design and 
adoption has been fairly well conceptualized, drawing more strongly on approaches borrowed 
from innovation research. Duncombe and Boateng (2009) note that this issue explains the 
dominance of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) which has been used to provide 
conceptual underpinning for studies of m - finance adoption. Based on the gaps identified by 
Duncombe and Boateng (2009), it is evident that there was need for further research on the 
supply side of m – finance, mostly the relationship dynamics that exist amongst the different m 
– finance actors. The limited use of theoretical frameworks to analyze m – finance services is 
an important area to address; and this study applied the principal – agent theory in analyzing m 
– finance, specifically mobile money services (M – PESA). 
 
In 2011 Adrian, Diniz & Porto de Albuquerque undertook a literature review of mobile money 
and payment based on academic and practitioner oriented publications for the period 2001 – 
2011. The review focused on mobile payment/mobile money with a special stress on local 
development, but not limited to works that dealt with development or developing countries 




examined a total of 94 peer reviewed and 92 non – peer reviewed papers. Adrian et al (2011) 
sought for information that could help to understand the following dimensions: the interactions 
between the different actors involved in mobile payment/mobile money initiatives; the factors 
that impeded or encouraged their adoption; the main services delivered; the effects on local 
flows of money; legal and regulatory environments as well as the role of authorities; and related 
issues of gender behaviour. 
 
In all the literature covered, Adrian et al (2011) indicate they found that little attention had been 
paid to the above-mentioned dimensions they searched for. The gaps in the literature, that relate 
to the dimension on interactions between the different actors involved in mobile 
payment/mobile money initiatives, is an area that this study investigated. Within this dimension 
of interaction of different actors, the research focused mainly on the relationship dynamics of 
the actors responsible for the supply side of mobile money services. An investigation into these 
interactions provides understanding of the relationship dynamics and their implications on 
availability and access to the services; as well as success or failure of the services.   
 
Adrian et al (2011) indicate that the central themes of study in the majority of analysed articles 
focus on issues such as adoption or market analysis and neglecting other relevant themes, such 
as regulation and effective socio-economic impacts. Adrian et al (2011) further note that they 
identified a theoretical gap in the central themes of study as most of the articles use theoretical 
models like TAM (Technology Acceptance Model) and its variations to identify the factors that 
may influence the adoption of mobile money and payment. It is evident that the focus has been 
on understanding the demand side and market context but has not focused on understanding the 
supply side of mobile money services. An understanding of the supply side can provide answers 
to critical questions on adoption of mobile money services by consumers. Literature on mobile 
money (Mas and Morawczynski 2009; Donovan 2015; Aron 2015 etc.) emphasises the 
importance of customer experience, in particular trust by customers in the service, and these 
factors are largely driven by the relationship dynamics on the supply side. This study aimed to 
provide an understanding of the supply side of mobile money and also introduces a different 
theoretical perspective by using the principal – agent theory/problem. 
 
A geographic gap was also identified, with studies concentrated in a few cases/countries, and 
emphasis on Kenya and the Philippines. According to Adrian et al (2011) this concentration 




geographic element is important as mobile money initiatives have been deployed worldwide, 
with some being successful and others not successful. Despite emphasis being on Kenya due to 
its successes, there are other studies which have been conducted in Africa, such as on M – 
PESA in Tanzania and have provided knowledge on mobile money services in the different 
contexts. The geographic focus of this study is Lesotho, and similarly with its own context can 
provide valuable knowledge on the provision of mobile money services. 
 
Adrian et al (2011) indicate that another important gap identified is the relative absence of an 
analysis of the economic or social impact. Most studies, in particular non-academic ones, take 
social and economic impacts for granted or just give them a cursory mention, without further 
investigation or corroborative analysis (Adrian et al, 2011). This study examined to a limited 
extent the relationship dynamics of M – PESA actors and potential economic implications of 
the relationships on M – PESA actors.  
 
Adrian et al (2011) also recommended future areas for research based on the gaps in knowledge 
identified. Emphasis for future research must be placed on understanding the process of 
building such a complex network of relationships and suggest analysis to be conducted of the 
actors’ interactions that made it possible for the complex mobile payments/mobile money 
network to grow (Adrian et al, 2011). Other areas for future research as outlined by Adrian et 
al (2011) include: the typology of business models, the legal issues involved in the 
implementations (whether successful or unsuccessful), the kinds of technology associated with 
the particular business models adopted, cultural and demand conditions for a model being 
disseminated, an analysis of the telecommunications and banking market, obstacles to its 
adoption, gender issues and services. 
 
The analysis of literature undertaken by (Dahlberg et al 2007; Duncombe and Boateng 2009 
and Adrian et al 2011) covered areas that are related or in fact the same, being either m – 
finance, mobile payments/mobile money and mobile payments. The use of different definitions 
or names to describe these services presents a challenge as an impression is given that they are 
different services. However, the issues discussed by the different reviews are relevant to this 
research, and for its purpose, mobile money was used generally throughout the study.  
 
The reviews by (Dahlberg et al 2007; Duncombe and Boateng 2009 and Adrian et al 2011) 




of the services by consumers, a focus on the delivery technology and dominant application of 
the acceptance models and narrow application of theoretical frameworks. This study intended 
to bridge the research gap by examining the relationship dynamics of mobile money delivery 
actors using the principal – agent theory/problem; and implications for access and availability 
of mobile money services.  
 
3.5 The Principal – Agent Problem and the M – PESA Context  
Specific research conducted on M – PESA is largely dominated by success in Kenya. The 
research is dominated by customer adoption issues and analysis on why M – PESA was 
successful in Kenya. Research work by Morawczynski (2011), Mas and Morawcszynski 
(2009), Otieno and Kahonge (2014) etc. generally focused on adoption and success factors that 
brought M – PESA to scale in Kenya. This research focus corroborates the literature review 
findings by (Dahlberg et al 2007; Duncombe and Boateng 2009 and Adrian et al 2011). 
 
The structure of the M – PESA supply side resembles that of a distribution network and is 
hierarchical in nature. This hierarchical network consists of Vodacom, Super – Agents and 
Lower – Tier Agents, with Super – Agents assuming management responsibilities of Lower – 
Tier Agents. With the exception of Vodacom, the different tiers of agents are independent 
business entities with core interests outside of mobile money. The M – PESA supply network 
therefore consists of multiple principals and agents. Vodacom has a set of requirements that 
agents must meet prior to providing M – PESA services, and Super – Agents are obliged to sign 
a contract with Vodacom. The Super – Agents are responsible for supervising agents they 
recruit, mainly on ensuring that the Lower – Tier Agents maintain adequate cash and electronic 
float inventories and adhere to stipulated service standards. The agents invest their own capital 
to purchase electronic money from Vodacom. According to Anon (2015) contracts between 
operators and agents vary considerably across markets, but common clauses include: operators 
and agents being able to terminate the contract at any time; prohibition of sub-licensing or 
delegating by the agent; agents maintaining a stipulated level of float; agents carrying out 
AML/CTF checking and meeting any reporting obligations of the operator; operators reserving 
the right to vary commissions at any time; agents using only marketing materials of the operator 
with which they are furnished.  
 
Monitoring of the agents by Vodacom is mostly undertaken through the electronic system in 
place and focuses on cash and e – float inventories and incidents of fraud. Physical monitoring 




platform and Super – Agents to monitor. Incentives for agents to provide mobile money services 
are based on the number of customers registered and number of transactions made, i.e. cash – 
in and cash – out transactions made. Super – Agents and Lower – Tier Agents in a sub – network 
share the commissions, with Super – Agents receiving roughly 30% and Lower – Tier Agents 
70%.  
 
According to Anon (2015), citing Lonie (2013) the commissions paid express the agent’s 
opportunity cost as they must invest their cash in an e – money float account, which could 
otherwise be used to purchase inventory for their core business.) Incentives in the initial 
contract must be sufficient to provide a return on the agents’ mobile money investment that 
makes it worthwhile to divert resources from their core business until the service reaches critical 
mass and becomes a significant income stream (Anon, 2015). A key issue that is relevant for 
agent incentives in M – PESA is that because Vodacom has delegated some responsibilities to 
agents, there is a significant element of risk transfer to the agents. The transfer of risk is an 
important element related to the agent incentives.  
 
Based on the definition of the principal agent problem by Eisenhardt (1989), the M – PESA 
supply network is susceptible to the principal – agent problem. Eisenhardt (1989) indicates that 
the agency problem arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and 
(b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing i.e. the 
principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The principal – agent problem 
can permeate the M – PESA supply network through two channels, the first being at the time 
of registering an independent business as a mobile money service provider. Secondly within 
the mobile money service network amongst the multiple principals and agents, post registration.   
 
According to Rauchhaus (2009), scholars (Mas – Colell, Whinston and Green 1995:477) have 
distinguished between two types of principal agent problems: those resulting from hidden 
actions and those resulting from hidden information. Rauchhaus (2009) indicates that hidden 
action is what generates moral hazard; hidden information is associated with adverse selection. 
The two principal – agent problems also differ in their focus on timing; moral hazard occurs 
when a principal is unable to observe an agent’s behaviour once the contract is in place; and 
adverse selection stems from uncertainty concerning an agent’s preferences prior to creating a 
contract (Rauchhaus, 2009). As indicated, two channels through which the principal agent 




agent problems described by Rauchhaus (2009). This research study attempted to establish 
which of the two principal agent problems dominates and as a result explain any inefficiencies, 
risks, challenges, vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes in mobile money. 
 
Shah (2014) indicates that for the principal – agent relationship to be problematic conflicting 
incentives and private information are needed. Within the M – PESA supply network it is 
evident that the conflicting incentives exist between the multiple principals and agents. The 
agents have their own core business, and the assumption is that if the incentives are not 
satisfactory, they will act contrary to the principals’ expectations. On the other hand, the issue 
of private information plays out at the time of registration and after registration. The agents 
may deliberately withhold or not provide accurate information just to become a service 
provider, and after registration the principals may not have full information on the operations 
of the agents’ businesses that may affect the services.  
 
Super and Lower – Tier Agents undertake the main functions that enable access and usage of 
the service. They register customers in accordance with the requirements set by the Mobile 
Network Operator (Vodacom) and also perform cash – in and cash – out functions to customers 
i.e. registered customers make deposits and withdrawals at the agent outlets. This function 
requires agents to maintain adequate inventories of cash on their premises and e – float on their 
cell phones. Jack and Suri (2011) indicate that agents face a non – trivial inventory management 
problem, as they have to predict the time profile of net e – float needs, while maintaining the 
security of their operations. From a principal – agent problem perspective, a certain amount of 
risk is shifted by the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and super agents to the agents; in 
exchange for commissions on registration of new customers and cash – in and cash – out 
transactions. It was therefore important to establish whether the agents are risk averse and 
consider the incentives in the form of commissions as requisite to the risks they carry or not. 
The implications of either scenario were examined in relation to access and availability of 
services and effects on the broader supply network.  
 
Mas and Morawcszynski (2009) indicate that the single most important aspect of the M – PESA 
service that needs to be monitored is the retail agents’ availability of working capital to meet 
customer demands for cash withdrawals. Eijkman, Kendall and Mas (2010) explored the 
liquidity needs of M – PESA outlets in Kenya using transactional data over a period of six 
months from a sample of 20 retail outlets. Eijkman et al (2010) revealed seven key patterns and 




rural areas do fewer and smaller transactions, in the city centre transactions are much larger (3) 
rural areas are strongly cash out, whereas urban areas tend to be cash in. From the observations 
made, Eijkman et al (2010) came up with three high level conclusions that (1) stores require 
intense daily liquidity management support (2) rural areas face greater difficulties (3) there is 
evidence of market discipline between stores. The work and findings of Eijkman et al (2010) is 
relevant to assessing the extent and how the principal agent problem manifests itself in the M 
– PESA service network. In this regard a key variable for assessment identified was liquidity 
management which was used to determine whether or not the agents were still aligned with the 
principals’ goals and expectations. Despite the conclusions made by Eijkman et al (2010) there 
are shortcomings as their analysis only focused on transactional data but did not interact directly 
with the agents to investigate other factors which may affect liquidity management such as 
infrastructure on the premises, capital investment requirements for the agents’ core businesses 
etc.         
 
 
Mobile money should at a bare minimum assist in three ways, firstly increase convenience by 
reducing travelling and queuing times, secondly due to the virtual element of mobile money 
increase safety of transactions for users when transacting through the mobile device as it is 
inherent that by instantly transacting live users begin to trust the system; and finally mobile 
money offerings through their footprint of agents and outlets, give the user a greater control on 
where to transact, which helps protect privacy and reduce corruption (Heyer and Mas, 2009). 
This statement by Heyer and Mas (2009) has not considered the possibility of the principal – 
agent problem’s existence within the mobile money supply network. The assumption in this 
case is that the agents’ behaviour is not always observed and known and therefore 
vulnerabilities to fraud, violation of privacy etc. may exist.   
  
Cobert, Helms & Parker (2012) indicate that agent quality is critical for maintaining customers’ 
faith in mobile money systems and suggest that recruiting only high – potential early adopters 
such as retail chains, or aggregators, such as Super – Agents. As indicated the principal – agent 
problem can permeate the mobile money supply network at the point of agent recruitment and 
as such Cobert et al (2012) have not considered the element of adverse selection in the 
recruitment of the high potential agents. Another related issue in post registration is that in the 
case of Super – Agents, their commission structure is based on number of Lower – Tier Agents 
they enrol and manage as well as the number of customers registered and transactions made; 




numbers for more commission. This may occur without the principal’s knowledge and have 
implications on the quality of services and damage the mobile money services’ credibility.      
 
The literature covered on M – PESA demonstrates that although there were channels through 
which the principal – agent problem can permeate the supply network; this issue has not been 
considered in the research. The studies undertaken provide a simplistic view of the mobile 
money services and have not considered the complex structure of the services’ delivery, the 
relationship dynamics of the different actors and implications on the quality, access and 
availability of the services. The review further identified the absence of theoretical frameworks 
in the mobile money literature that can be used to assess the extent of the principal agent 
problem in mobile money and implications for access and availability of services. As a result, 
due to the distribution network nature of mobile money services, supply chain publications 
were reviewed and there were publications that applied the principal agency theory to 
frameworks that examined risk and quality in supply chain networks.     
 
3.6 Principal - Agent Problem in Supply Chain Management 
The agency problem structure has been applied in a variety of settings such as vertical 
integration relationships; executive compensation; employment relationships; budgeting and 
inter – organisational relationships (Zu and Kaynak, 2012). Recent work in the area of supply 
chain management and logistics provided an insight into assessing the principal – agent problem 
in distribution networks. This work is relevant and applicable to mobile money services given 
its setup of a distribution network.    
 
Cheng and Kam (2008) applied the agency theory to develop a conceptual framework for 
analysing risk in supply networks. According to Cheng and Kam (2008), the complex mix of 
heterogeneous collaborators in supply networks increases the complexity of the risk profiles of 
inter – related components within networks. In the same manner, the M – PESA distribution 
network includes a complex mix of heterogeneous collaborators, especially the agents that 
range from large retail chain stores to small stores in various geographic locations. To develop 
the analytic framework, Cheng and Kam (2008) place the principal – agent relationship in the 
context of a business network. Firms taking part in one end product supply network are assumed 
to be competing against alternative comparable end product networks; or an agent of an end 
product network may also be participating in other non – comparable end product networks, 
which are referred to as latent networks (Cheng and Kam, 2008). The M – PESA distribution 




agents are competing against other entities providing similar mobile money services from other 
MNOs. Furthermore, M – PESA services are not the agents’ primary business and are therefore 
participating in latent networks. In addition, there are instances where M – PESA agents provide 
alternative mobile money services, in this case Ecocash by Econet Wireless in the same 
premises without either principals’ knowledge.     
 
The conceptual framework as proposed by Chen and Kam (2008) only focuses on addressing 
operational risks which they refer to as variations in the distribution of outcomes from expected 
or agreed targets. Chen and Kam (2008), citing Juttner (2003) indicate that adverse outcomes 
represent realisation of risk and refer to any disruption that affects flows of information 
and/services from one entity to another in the network in connection to the delivery of a final 
product or service to the end customer. Chen and Kam (2008) identify risk factors which may 
influence variations to the service as distinctive supply related characteristics of each entity that 
include environment, infrastructure, and service delivery, inter organisational linkages or a 
combination of all. Chen and Kam (2008) further outline the role of each of the risk factors in 
the supply chain. The risk factors identified equally apply to the M – PESA distribution network 
and it can be assumed that for any occurrence of any of the factors, there will be variations in 
the provision of services to M – PESA users. The extent of occurrence of these risk factors was 
applied to determine the extent of the principal – agent problem and its implications in the M – 
PESA supply chain.  
 
In developing the conceptual framework, Chen and Kam (2008) define the network structure 
to determine patterns of delegation, interdependency and interaction; then analyse the dynamics 
of risk in the network to establish nodes of risk precondition, events, footprints, propagation 
and backlash. Lastly Chen and Kam (2008) assess impact of risk to establish impact on 
individual and sub components of the network as well as on the entire network. This 
methodology adopted by Chen and Kam (2008) is a deductive approach that enables clear 
identification of how the network is structured, where linkages are within the network, the risk 
factors and area of occurrence and; lastly assess the impact of risk. This is an important area as 
the M – PESA platform has evolved from just a money transfer platform to include elements 
of payments and therefore becoming more complex. Despite not applying the framework with 
real business examples, Chen and Kam’s (2008) findings are that the framework demonstrates 
how risk factors are affected by complex relationships found in networks through agreements 




exogenous risks can arise from latent networks and hidden perceptions and assessments that 
the principals and agents engage in during the supply process.  
 
Roh and Whipple (2010) used the agency theory for assessing the likelihood of quality fade in 
buyer – supplier relationships and prescribing contractual mechanisms for reducing quality 
fade. Quality fade, an element of supply chain vulnerability is the unforeseen deterioration of 
agreed to or expected quality levels with respect to product and/or service requirements (Roh 
and Whipple, 2010). Some examples of service quality fade include using less costly but lower 
service transportation providers which may reduce on – time delivery performance; holding 
less than agreed to inventory levels which could negatively impact customer service etc. (Roh 
and Whipple, 2010). 
 
Roh and Whipple (2010) indicate that quality fade in both product and service requirements 
can lead to product safety concerns, reduced customer service, lost sales, added costs, and other 
negative consequences for the buying firm. Roh and Whipple (2010) further note that quality 
fade maybe an intentional or unintentional action. In this case Roh and Whipple (2010) indicate 
that the other occurs by intentionally violating agreed to expectations and the other happens in 
the sense that complacency or lack of attention to detail occurs, and individuals and firms may 
fail to provide agreed to performance. Quality fade in the supply chain context can also occur 
in the mobile money supply chain, for example M – PESA agents may intentionally or 
unintentionally violate agreed to performance levels with the Mobile Network Operator 
(MNO). On the other hand, the MNO may fail to do continuous screening of new agents or fail 
to train agents as for example more value added services are included on M – PESA and more 
agents recruited, and thus quality fade can occur. 
 
Middler (2007), as cited by Roh and Whipple (2010) suggests that often quality fade is not 
readily detected as the quality degradation occurs incrementally over time; and as such is not 
often recognised until a disruption actually occurs. In the event a disruption occurs in mobile 
money, the ultimate responsibility falls on the MNO who is the owner of the services, and not 
the agent who has delegated responsibility. This raises the importance of monitoring and 
verification as indicated in the principal agency theory. In this case does the MNO adequately 
monitor and verify the actions of the various M – PESA agents to detect any symptoms of 
quality fade over time? The existence and use of information systems in M – PESA by the 
MNO and agents enables monitoring and verification, however to what extent is the system 





Roh and Whipple (2010) provide a theoretical model for assessing quality fade in the form of 
a governance matrix that considers outcome measurability and outcome uncertainty in a supply 
chain and logistics context. The matrix addresses three issues (1) vulnerability of each 
transacting party (2) the proposed efficient mix of contract types; (3) the appropriate actions to 
reduce the potential for quality fade and balance the costs of monitoring the agent’s behaviour 
versus the costs of measuring the outcomes and transferring risk to the agent. The governance 
decision matrix as indicated by Roh and Whipple (2010) illustrates four different outsourcing 
governance scenarios that take into account the buyers’ and suppliers vulnerability. The 
scenarios as outlined are (1) low outcome measurability and uncertainty (2) low outcome 
measurability and high – outcome measurability (3) high outcome measurability and low 
outcome uncertainty (4) high outcome measurability and high outcome uncertainty. Identifying 
the vulnerability of each transacting party within the different scenarios enables one to 
determine whether goal conflict and information asymmetry exist. The framework enables the 
identification of major factors that influence supplier actions. Roh and Whipple (2010) 
conclude that two specific considerations – low outcome measurability and high outcome 
uncertainty place a buyer (the principal) at greater risk of quality fade.  The governance matrix 
with some modifications was applied to assess the extent of the principal – agent problem in 
the M – PESA distribution network.  
 
The framework proposed by Roh and Whipple (2010) uses a simple example that does not have 
multiple principals and agents, and may not be useful in such cases. The scenarios proposed are 
realistic but however they focus mostly on the environment within which the supplier operates; 
and does not give room for assessing the differences in suppliers’ capabilities in the supply 
chain. Within the M – PESA network there are aspects such as geographic location, 
infrastructure and financial capability that must be considered to determine differences among 
the agents delegated to provide M – PESA services. These aspects can contribute to determining 
the vulnerability of each party and therefore the extent/level of the principal – agent problem 
across the distribution network.    
 
The two frameworks discussed raise two key elements which can be used to guide the 
assessment of the extent of the principal – agent problem in mobile money and implications on 
access and availability. The first element is risk which can be used to identify any deviations 




to determine deviation as well as implications. The proposed research study applied an 
adaptation of these frameworks to assess the extent of the principal – agent problem and its 
implications on service delivery.    
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The literature covered suggests that there are gaps in mobile money research, in particular 
analysis on the relationship dynamics of the supply side and use of more theoretical frameworks 
for analysis of mobile money. The literature review identified conceptual frameworks 
developed in the area of supply chain management. These frameworks provide the possibility 
to assess the extent of the principal agent problem and its implications on access and availability 
of mobile money services. The case study of M – PESA in Lesotho presented the opportunity 
to apply these frameworks and contribute to better understanding and analysis of work on the 
supply side of mobile money.  
  
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Research Approach and Strategy 
The research study adopted a qualitative approach because it focused on examining relationship 
dynamics between entities. The qualitative approach enabled discussions with M – PESA 
agents on their daily operations, challenges encountered in providing the services, relations 
with the principals (Super – Agents and Vodacom) and Super – Agents and Lower – Tier 
Agents. In addition, a quantitative analysis using secondary data in the form of agent 
transactional data was undertaken to complement the qualitative results. 
 
4.2 Data Collection, Frequency and Choice of Data 
The study population consisted of 1,999 M – PESA Lesotho agents, which included 15 Super 
– Agents, with 7 only active; i.e. 1,984 Lower – Tier Agents and 15 Super – Agents. Vodacom 
Lesotho staff members with responsibilities for M – PESA services were part of the study 
population. The sample size consisted of 35 agents and were categorised as 5 Super – Agents 
and 6 – Lower Tier Agents for each of the 5 Super – Agents i.e. 5 Super – Agents and 30 Lower 
Tier Agents. A sample size of 35 was selected due to logistical feasibility and time constraints. 




PESA agents and high volume of transactions. An alternate sample of 30 Lower – Tier Agents 
was drawn up to counter instances where agents in the main sample were not available to be 
interviewed. The agent sample was derived from the Vodacom Lesotho agent database and 
mainly consisted of agents that provided M – PESA services within the past 4 years. The 4-
year period was used as M – PESA services were introduced in Lesotho in 2013. This was to 
ensure that active players with a relative reasonable experience and knowledge about the 
business dynamics of M – PESA were included and effected contribution to the study. 5 
Vodacom M – PESA officials responsible for management of the agent network and overall M 
– PESA services were interviewed.  
 
An interview question guide was used to conduct agent interviews. Due to the different 
responsibilities of Super – Agents and Lower – Tier Agents, the interview question guide for 
each tier differed. Another interview question guide was developed for discussions with the 
Vodacom staff. All of the question guides consisted of open ended and closed questions 
depending on the detail and type of information required.  
4.3 Sampling 
Purposive sampling was used to select the agent sample; specifically, maximum variation 
sampling strategy was applied and entailed two stages. In the first stage 5 Super – Agents out 
of the 7 operating Super – Agents based in Maseru were selected. The second stage involved 
selection of the 30 Lower – Tier Agents under the management of the 5 Super – Agents selected 
in stage 1, with 6 Lower – Tier Agents per Super – Agent. The 1 Super – Agent and 6 Lower – 
Tier Agents were treated as a sub network in order to align with the framework to be applied 
for data collection and analysis. The transactional data for each of the 35 agents selected was 
used as a measure of performance of agents. 
 
Purposive sampling was selected as the preferred method due to the heterogeneity of the agents 
participating in the M – PESA network. According to Patton (1990), the maximum variation 
strategy for purposeful sampling captures and describes the central themes or principal 
outcomes that cut across a great deal of participant or programme variation. Patton (1990) 
further notes that for small samples a great deal of heterogeneity can be a problem because 
individual cases are different from each other. However, Patton (1990) notes that the maximum 
variation sampling strategy turns that apparent weakness into a strength by applying the logic 
that any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value 




the maximum variation strategy was applied since it permitted the heterogeneous collaborators 
to be represented in the sample and allowed for variations and similarities across agents and 
sub networks to be adequately captured in the sample as well as enabled comparisons to be 
made across the agent sub networks. 
 
Suri (2011) indicates that a maximum variation sample is constructed by identifying key 
dimensions of variations and then finding cases that vary from each other as much as possible. 
For purposes of this study the dimensions of variation that were identified are the following: 
1. Number of registered customers per agent – highest and lowest  
2. E float available per agent – highest and lowest  
3. Total number of transactions made since 2013 – highest and lowest  
4. Total number of Lower – Tier Agents under management (applies to Super – Agents) 
– highest and lowest. 
5. Type/size of agent core business – small and largest  
6. Location – distance from city centre – nearest and farthest  
Suri (2011) citing Patton (2002) indicates that the maximum variation sample yields high 
quality detailed descriptions of each case, which are useful for documenting uniqueness and 
important shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance from having 
emerged out of heterogeneity. In the same manner this study aimed to identify essential and 
variable features of the principal – agent problem in mobile money.   
 
Constraints associated with the sampling method selected as indicated by Duan, Green, 
Hoagwood, Horwitz, Palinkas & Wisdom (2013) mainly relate to the fact that it is highly prone 
to researcher bias. The idea that a purposive sample has been created based on the judgment of 
the researcher is not a good defence when it comes to alleviating possible researcher biases, 
especially when compared with probability sampling techniques that are designed to reduce 
such biases (Duan et al, 2013). Duan et al (2013), further note that this subjective component 
of purpose sampling is only a major disadvantage where judgements have not been based on 
clear criteria, whether a theoretical framework, expert elicitation, or some other accepted 
criteria. In order to mitigate this constraint, the dimensions of variation identified for sample 
selection were clear, linked to the research questions, and were adopted from the literature 





4.4 Data Analysis Methods 
The thematic analysis approach was followed to undertake the qualitative analysis. Braun and 
Clarke (2006) define thematic analysis as a method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns or themes within data. Thematic analysis was selected as the ideal approach for analysis 
due to its advantages that are relevant to the current research. Braun and Clarke (2006) indicate 
that thematic analysis can highlight similarities and differences across the data set, generate 
unanticipated insights and its usefulness for producing qualitative analyses suited to informing 
policy development. This qualitative analytical approach was also used as indicated by Bondas, 
Turunen & Vaismoradi (2013) to improve validity and the consistency between the purpose of 
the study and the method of data analysis. 
 
The phases of thematic analysis as described by Braun and Clarke (2006) were followed to 
enable systematic analysis of the data. The phases are as follows: data familiarization; code 
generation; searching for; reviewing; defining and naming themes; and producing the report. 
Familiarization of the data was through notes made during the interviews with the agents and 
officials and with the transcription of the recorded interviews. The adapted analytical 
framework depicted in Figure 8 was used to guide the processes of coding, identifying, 
reviewing and defining relevant themes. The analytical framework main components, namely 
defining network structure, identifying adverse selection and moral hazard, and their respective 
sub – components were used as the basis for the information coding and served the purposes of 
a thematic map. The coded information was then grouped under each relevant component and 
sub – component of the analytical framework. The information was reviewed and interpreted 
to generate results deriving from the respective components and corresponding sub – 
components.    
 
The results from the components and sub – components were reviewed and a comparison of 
the results was made across the three main components. Secondary agent transactional data was 
used in the analysis to complement the information gathered from the interviews to support the 
validity of the findings. The write up of the organised information, interpretation and findings 
was structured in accordance with the main research questions and the analytical framework. 
 
An adaptation of the conceptual frameworks developed by Chem and Kam (2008) and Roh and 
Whipple (2010) was developed and applied to guide the data analysis process as described 




deductive approach enabled identification of elements of potential risk and vulnerabilities that 
can be interpreted as existence of the principal – agent problem; enabled identification of the 





















     












   
    
 Functional roles of the Primary Principal (PP), 
Secondary Principals (SP) and Agents (A). 
 Interaction and feedback between the PP, SP and A. 
 Interaction and feedback between and within sub – 
networks and whole network. 
 Agent characteristics - SP and A. 
 To establish agent heterogeneity across the network. 
 To establish agents’ core business and existence of latent networks. 
 To establish risk allocation and distribution between the PP, SP and A, i.e. within the 
whole network and sub – networks. 
 To establish performance standards set at different levels of the network; and PP 
expectations. 
 To establish Contract types between PP and SP; and SP and A. 
 




 Assessing Goal Conflict 
between the PP and SP. 
 
 Assessing Goal Conflict 
between the SP and A.  
Channel 1: Adverse Selection (AS) 
 Assessing the deviation or adherence to 
SPs selection by the PP. 
 
 Assessing the deviation or adherence to 
As selection by the SP. 
 
Elements/Outputs from Assessments 
Assessing Goal Conflict  
 To establish extent of Adverse Selection in the 
network and sub – networks. 
 To establish agents’ (SP and A) understanding of 
contract obligations and risks. 
 To establish agents’   understanding/expectation of 
incentives and risk allocation. 
 To establish dominant source of AS in the 
network/sub – network. 
 To establish potential of quality fade and risk 




Channel 2: Moral Hazard (MH) Assessing Latent Networks 
 Assessing deviation or adherence from 
prescribed performance by the PP, SPs 
and As.  
 
 Assessing deviation or adherence from 





 Assessing the effect of latent 





Elements/Outputs from Assessments 
 To establish extent of Moral Hazard in the network and 
sub - networks.  
 To establish service delivery/operations 
vulnerabilities/quality fade/risk conditions and effects as 
a result of Moral Hazard in the network and sub – 
networks. 
 To establish effectiveness of monitoring by the PP and 
SPs.  

































Comparison of Network Structural and Relationship Dynamics, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Assessment Outputs with Agent 
Performance 
 
Adverse Selection and Moral 





Network Structural Relationship 











 To establish resilience of the networks and sub 
– networks. 
 To establish whether deviations from 
prescribed performance affect performance. 
 To establish implications on access and 








4.5 Research Reliability and Validity 
This study was conducted using the qualitative research design method. Consideration of the 
aspects of reliability and validity in qualitative research as indicated by Noble and Smith (2015) 
was made throughout the phases of the study. Credibility of the study was ensured by the use of a 
theoretical framework that defined the focus area of the study and guided discussions with 
participants. In addition, the researcher through interviews interacted with a number of participants 
engaged in the mobile money delivery network at various levels; and observations on the operations 
of agents during and after interviews as well as while waiting to conduct agent interviews were 
made. Data from the interviews, secondary agent transactional data and the researcher’s 
observations was cross checked to enhance credibility. The applicability of the study was attained 
by applying the purposive sampling technique which enabled data on various dimensions to be 
collected and analysed. Applicability was further strengthened by the use of an adapted analytical 
framework that enabled systematic analysis of the information collected.  
 
The focus area of this research study is new and the researcher was not entirely familiar with it. 
The unfamiliarity limited the biasness of the researcher as the study was conducted. 
 
4.6 Limitations 
The following are limitations of the study that were identified and must be taken into account when 
considering the findings of the research study.  
 
1. Braun and Clarke (2006) indicate that a disadvantage to consider is that a thematic analysis has 
limited interpretative power beyond mere description if it is not used within an existing 
theoretical framework that anchors the analytic claims that are made. The analytical framework 
applied in this research study is an adaptation of frameworks that have not been applied and 
tested in the real world. The modified analytical framework was specifically for this study and 
potentially has weaknesses of the original frameworks when applied in actual situations. The 
findings of this study have been likely affected by these weaknesses. However, the analytical 
framework applied in this study provided a systematic approach to data collection and analysis; 
and overtime with testing, review and improvements it can deliver enhanced analysis and 
results. 
 
2. The context and setting of this research study was in Lesotho which is characterised by lower 
number of mobile money transactions, agents, customers and competitors. In addition, the 




the sample size of the study was not adequate to generalise the findings of the study. This 
research study focused on one specific mobile money delivery model i.e. M – PESA in Lesotho 
and did not take account of other models for provision of mobile money offered in Lesotho and 
other countries, thus affecting the findings’ generalisability. 
 
3. During the period of undertaking the research, there was uncertainty on whether M – PESA 
services would be terminated as in the case of M – PESA services in South Africa. Fortunately, 






5 RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This section of the research report presents main findings of the study derived from the interviews 
conducted and analysis from secondary agent transactional data. The findings are reflected in a 
manner that is consistent with the analytical framework illustrated in the previous chapter. This is 
to ensure that the information is systematically presented to provide direction on the research 
questions and objectives of this study. The section includes a comparison of the main thematic 
areas of the analytical framework namely: network structural relationship dynamics, agent 
recruitment and selection and agent performance. A conclusion of findings is provided at the end 
of this section. 
 
5.1 The Network Structure and Relationship Dynamics 
The M – PESA network structure consists of a distribution network made up of various independent 
business entities with delegated authority from Vodacom to provide M – PESA mobile money 
services. The research sought to understand the relationship dynamics within the network of agents, 
in particular issues on agent heterogeneity, agent interactions, latent networks, risk distribution, 
allocation and vulnerabilities in the network and performance standards for agents.  
 
5.1.1 Agent Heterogeneity 
To assess agent heterogeneity, the dimensions of variation used to select the agent samples were 
applied and comprise of the following: 
 Number of registered customers per agent – highest and lowest.  
 E float available per agent – highest and lowest.  
 Total number of transactions made since 2013 – highest and lowest.  
 Total number of Lower – Tier Agents under management (applies to Super – Agents) – 
highest and lowest. 
 Type/size of agent core business – small and largest.  
 Location – distance from the central business district – nearest and farthest.  
 








Table 1: Summary of Agent Heterogeneity 
Dimensions of Variation Super Agents Lower Tier 
Agents 
n % n % 
Number of Registered Customers Lower Tier Agents     
1900 – 8500    12 40 
8500 – 17000    18 60 
Number of Registered Customers Super Agents     
16000 – 22000  3 60   
22000 – 28000  2 40   
E float available per Lower Tier Agent     
LSL19,000 – LSL65,000    14 47 
LSL65,000 – LSL130,000    16 53 
E float available per Super-Agent      
LSL320,000 – LSL385,000  2 40   
LSL385,000 – LSL770,000 3 60   
Total number of transactions made since 2013 Lower Tier Agents     
1700 – 3440    17 57 
3440 – 6880    13 43 
Total number of transactions made since 2013 Super Agents     
35800 – 42700  2 40   
42700 – 85500  3 60   
Number of lower tier agents per Super-Agent      
200 – 300  1 25   
300 – 600  4 75   
Average Annual Revenue from Core Business Lower Tier Agents     
Average annual revenue LSL350,000 – LSL2,100,000   17 57 
Average annual revenue LSL2,100,000 – LSL4,200,000   13 43 
Average Annual Revenue from Core Business Super Agents      
Average annual revenue LSL6,000,000 – LSL7,500,000  2 40   
Average annual revenue LSL7,500,000 – LSL15,000,000  3 60   
Location – distance from city centre Lower Tier Agents     
<10km   28 93 
=10km   2 7 
Location – distance from city centre Super Agents     
<10km 10 100   
=10km 0 0   
 
 
5.1.2 Number of Registered Customers 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the number of registered customers of Super – Agents and Lower – Tier Agents 



















The majority of Super – Agents had less than 22,000 registered M – PESA customers, with the 
highest number of registered customers for a Super – Agent being 27,857 and the lowest with 
19,348 registered customers. The average number of registered customers for Lower – Tier Agents 
was 8000, with 17,000 registered customers the highest and 1,955 the lowest number of registered 
customers. The respondents indicated that the high number of registered customers was due to 
Vodacom emphasising on the registration of customers at introduction of M – PESA and 
registration as agents. The agents and Vodacom officials indicated that the most important factor 
that pushed agent customer registration was the incentives in the form of commissions received by 
the agents. As one lower tier agent stated: 
 
“The Super – Agent that registered my business explained to me that in order for me to 
make a lot of money from M – PESA, I would have to make sure that I register as many 
customers as I could. I did not see this as a challenge because I already had a lot of 
customers coming to my store to buy food and other stuff. I encouraged my employees to 
talk to people to register because I understood that the more people I registered, the more 
commission I would receive.” 
The agents alluded to factors that may have contributed to the lower number of registered customers 
and they include, in the case of the Super – Agent registration as an M – PESA agent in March 
2016; and for Lower –Tier Agents, location in areas farther from the city centre, with less 
concentration of customers. Other Lower – Tier Agents indicated that they had to relocate to other 
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issue is the fact that the majority of agents were located within a radius of 10km within the city 
centre, an area with high competition for customers. 
 
5.1.3 Agent E – Float  
Maintaining adequate levels of e – float or electronic money is a key aspect of M – PESA services 
as it enables agents to provide cash – in and cash – out services. In addition, this is an aspect closely 
monitored by Vodacom and Super – Agents to ensure that it remains at the required levels for all 
agents. Figure 10 indicates the e – float available for Super – Agents and Lower – Tier Agents. 
 
Figure 10: Agent E – Float 
 
 
The highest amount of e – float for Super – Agents as at the end of August 2016 was LSL768, 221 
and the lowest was LSL326, 408. The average amount of e – float held by Super – Agents was 
LSL500, 000. The highest amount of e – float for Lower Tier Agents was LSL130, 000 and the 
lowest was LSL19, 000. There was consensus amongst the agents that the e – float held was not 
constant and changed depending on customer demand, in particular during month end and weekend 
periods when cash – in and cash – out transactions were high. The average amount of e – float held 
by the Lower Tier Agents was LSL59, 000.  
 
5.1.4 Agent Transactions 
Figure 11 depicts the cumulative total number of transactions of agents since the beginning of their 
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and cash withdrawals by customers; balancing of e – float and cash; and in the case of Super Agents 
cash – in and cash – out transactions as well as replenishing e – float for Lower Tier Agents. 





The highest number of transactions for Super Agents was 85, 475 with the lowest number of 
transactions at 35, 890. The Super – Agent with the highest number of transactions commenced M 
– PESA operations in 2013 and the Agent with the lowest in 2015. The average number of 
transactions carried out by Super – Agents was 57, 000. The highest number of transactions for 
Lower Tier Agents was 6,883 and the lowest was 1,643. The Lower – Tier Agent with the highest 
number of transactions commenced providing M – PESA services in 2014 and the lowest in 2016. 
The average number of transactions for the Lower Tier Agents was 4,000. According to the agents, 
the majority of the transactions were made during payday periods and weekends.  
 
5.1.5 Recruitment and Management of Lower Tier Agents by Super Agents 
The number of Lower – Tier Agents a Super – Agent can recruit and manage is not limited. Figure 


































Figure 12: Number of Lower – Tier Agents per Super – Agent  
 
 
The highest number of Lower – Tier Agents managed by a single Super – Agent was 615 and the 
lowest was 218. The type and size of the Lower – Tier Agents’ businesses Super – Agents’ 
management varied. The Super –Agents’ and Lower – Tier Agents’ businesses consist of either 
subsidiaries of their businesses; businesses within the same holding company as the Super –Agents; 
those within the same supply or distribution network related to their core business and largely small 
to medium enterprises. The majority of the Lower – Tier Agents under management of Super 
Agents were mainly independent businesses; and had prior business relations with them through 
distribution and reselling of airtime. 
 
5.1.6 Type/Size of Agent Core Business 
The Lesotho Industrial Licensing Act 2014 defines small and medium enterprises based on the 
number of employees and annual turnover thresholds. As defined by the Industrial Licensing Act 
2014, a small enterprise is an entity that employs between 6 and 21 employees with an annual 
turnover of less than LSL1, 000,000. The Act defines a medium enterprise as an entity that employs 
between 21 and 50 employees with an annual turnover of less than LSL5, 000, 000.  
For purposes of this study the type and size of the agents’ core business was assessed based on the 
Industrial Licensing Act 2014 definition of small and medium enterprises of annual turnover 
thresholds. Figure 13 indicates the average annual revenue of the Agents’ core business since 2013 
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All Super – Agents earned average annual revenue of LSL9, 700,000 since 2013. The highest 
revenue earned by a Super - Agent was LSL15, 000,000 and the lowest was LSL6, 500,000. Based 
on the Industrial Licensing Act 2014 definition, all Super – Agents can be classified as non – small 
or medium enterprises. Lower –Tier Agents earned average annual revenue of LSL1, 600, 000; 
with the highest revenue at LSL3, 600, 000 and lowest at LSL350, 000. The average annual revenue 
of 17 Lower – Tier Agents was less than LSL1, 000, 000 and can be classified as small enterprises. 
13 of the Lower – Tier Agents had average annual revenue of more than LSL1, 000, 000 but less 
than LSL5, 000, 000 and are therefore classified as medium enterprises. 
 
5.1.7 Agent Business Location from Central Business District  
Distance of the agents’ business premises from the Maseru central business district was assessed 
as part of the dimensions of variation. A radius of 10km from the central business district was 
selected due to the high concentration of businesses and population within a 10km radius. The 
Google Maps application was used to measure the respective distances. Figure 14 shows the 
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The average distance of Super – Agents’ business premises from the central business district was 
1.8km. All the Super – Agents’ premises were within a radius of 3km from the central business 
district. The average distance of Lower – Tier Agents’ business premises from the central business 
district was 5.3km. The agents emphasised the importance of being located within or closer to the 
central business district as there was a high volume of customers, ease of access to services related 
to their businesses as well as ease of access for customers. 
 
 
5.2 Agent Interactions and Feedback 
Interactions amongst the agents are between the Super – Agents and Lower – Tier Agents under 
their management. These interactions are compelled by the contracts signed by the parties. The 
agents all indicated that the intensity and frequency of the interactions has varied in line with 
registering as an agent and on issues of performance. The agents indicated that during the 
registration process and immediately after, there was a lot of interaction between the Super – Agent 
and Lower – Tier Agent. The interactions entailed convincing the Lower –Tier Agents to register 
and ensure that the Lower –Tier Agents are properly set up to provide services. The agents all 
agreed that interactions on performance issues were on maintaining adequate cash and e – float 
balances. The agents indicated that a lot of the feedback information was available on the M – 
PESA digital system as well as on transactional forms that are filled by the agents every time a 
transaction is performed. The agents noted that there was little or no interaction between the Lower 






















Distance from the Central Business District




Vodacom through its M – PESA Distribution and M – PESA Partnerships officials interact on a 
regular basis with Super – Agents on issues of performance, agent capacity and branding of M – 
PESA outlets. The interactions were important for M – PESA as they enabled the performance 
standards to be maintained at required levels, assisted Vodacom to quickly identify problems 
encountered by agents, and made it possible for Vodacom to assess, plan and introduce new 
services on the platform. The Vodacom officials emphasised that the Super – Agents played an 
important role of ‘outreach’ to the thousands of M – PESA agents and therefore the interactions 
were important. 
 
Challenges on interactions and feedback identified include: 
 Frequent changes in shop assistants providing M – PESA services, in particular at Lower – 
Tier Agent levels therefore requiring retraining and establishing new relationships. 
 
 Delays by Lower –Tier Agents to inform Super – Agents about any problems they encounter 
and delays by Super – Agents to respond to or address problems raised by the Lower –Tier 
Agents.  
 
5.3 Agent Recruitment 
The interview data was analysed to assess any deviation from prescribed agent selection processes 
and requirements. In addition, the analysis assessed the existence and extent of goal conflict 
between the Primary Principal (Vodacom) and Secondary Principal (Super Agents); and Secondary 
Principals and Lower – Tier Agents in the network at the recruitment stage.  
 
5.3.1 Agent Recruitment Criteria and Process 
Requirements for appointment as an authorised M – PESA agent are clearly stipulated by Vodacom. 
The requirements entail elements that include the legal registration of a potential agent as a 
business; minimum time of the business’ existence; infrastructure requirements mainly ICT 
equipment; and minimum cash investment for operating capital. The requirements for appointment 
between the Super – Agents and Lower – Tier Agents differ primarily on cash investment, 
infrastructure requirements and prerequisite for minimum number of lower tier agents. Exceptions 
are made for standalone businesses such as hotels to register as authorized Super –Agents, without 





Vodacom M – PESA Partnerships Officials undertake due diligence on potential Super – Agents 
to ensure that all prerequisites are met. The M – PESA Partnerships officials indicated that the due 
diligence process focused on the potential Super – Agents’ financials to ensure that it would be 
able to invest and sustain the proposed cash investment. The officials noted that another critical 
issue assessed was the ability of the potential Super – Agent to manage and sustain an agent 
network. The officials alluded to challenges in the recruitment process that include: delays in 
submission of required documentation such as valid tax clearance certificates by respective 
businesses, reluctance to disclose financial status of the business and appointment of personnel 
without decision – making authority in the business to lead the process. Due to such challenges the 
officials noted that the process could take up to 3 months or more to complete. However, the 
officials also expressed the view that these challenges were not encountered with all businesses; in 
particular, with those that already had a relationship with Vodacom as airtime 
wholesalers/distributors. The likelihood of a business being granted authorization to register as an 
M – PESA agent without meeting all requirements was non – existent due to the rigorous process 
used. As one official noted: 
 
“We go through stages with the agents until the process is complete. On completion of each stage 
authorisation is given by the division personnel involved such as legal division to proceed to the 
next stage. There is no way that we can continue with the process without the approval. After all 
the stages are completed, the Quality Assurance and Verification Team validate that all is in 
order, including physically inspecting the agents’ business premises.” 
 
The process and requirements for businesses to be appointed as M – PESA agents at the lower tier 
differ slightly from that of Super – Agents. The businesses must meet all legal requirements, 
undergo a due diligence process and provide the cash investment stipulated. The Super – Agents, 
with assistance and guidance from M – PESA Partnerships officials organise the registration 
process of the agents under their management. The Super – Agents cited challenges they 
encountered with recruiting lower tier agents and include the following: 
 
 Reluctance of some businesses to sign up as agents due to a lack of understanding of how 
the M – PESA service works, the commission structure, contributions towards branding 
and the overall benefits it had for any business. This reluctance required several meetings 
with the business representatives in order to convince them, and therefore prolonged 





 Delays in providing the required documentation, particularly bank statements by some 
businesses. 
 
 Delays in providing the required cash investment, some businesses opted out of the process 
at this stage when they had to release the funds. 
 
 Businesses deciding to withdraw completely from the registration process when it had 
already commenced.  
 
 Some businesses opting to register with the competitor Mobile Network Operator mobile 
money services.  
 
 Delegation of the registration process to employees without decision making authority and 
changes to employees given responsibility to facilitate the process. This resulted in 
distortion of information and misunderstanding, and therefore caused delays.  
 
These challenges were common amongst independent businesses as they occasionally encountered 
them with the businesses that were either their subsidiaries, part of one supply network or had an 
existing business relationship. The Super – Agents’ views were that it was easier to work with 
subsidiary businesses and those that they had an existing relationship with as they could easily 
access all the information needed. Some indicated that due to the standing relationships they had 
even advanced cash investments on behalf of businesses and agreed on repayments terms easily.  
 
The Lower – Tier Agents’ views on the requirements and process for appointment as an M – PESA 
agent were similar and reflected consensus on the following:   
 Generally, the requirements were not difficult to meet, in particular the legal 
documentation required. They cited difficulty in providing information on their business 
finances such as bank statements to either Vodacom officials or Super – Agent 
representatives.  
 
 Contribution towards M – PESA branding costs was an issue that some agents were 
dissatisfied with. Reasons for their dissatisfaction varied and included issues such as 




seemed unfair to pay for branding that largely was about Vodacom and therefore were of 
the view it had to pay for the branding. 
 
 The process to register as an agent took a long time, with several meetings on different 
issues. The expectation was that the process would not be long and they would start 
providing services within a reasonably short period of time.  
 
 Some of the agents that were subsidiaries of the Super – Agents did not have similar views 
like above, they indicated that most of the registration processes were directly dealt with 
by the head office or main company. However, some noted that they made input to the 
process by providing additional information and attending meetings when required.  
 
5.4 M – PESA Stakeholder Goals, Expectations and Risk Perceptions 
In order to assess the existence of goal conflict within the M – PESA distribution network, the data 
collected was examined to identify the stakeholders’ goals, expectations and risk perceptions in 
relation to providing the mobile money services.  
 
5.4.1 Vodacom Expectations on Agents  
Vodacom as the primary principal in the M – PESA mobile money services has specific corporate 
goals, objectives and expectations regarding M – PESA.  
 
The M – PESA Partnership officials interviewed indicated that Vodacom’s main expectation was 
for agents to adhere to the terms and conditions of the contracts signed with Vodacom. The 
emphasis in adherence was to ensure that agents maintain the standards and quality stipulated for 
providing M – PESA services. An expectation on maintaining stipulated standards is placed on 
agents because they are the direct link between the service and customers. The officials’ views 
were that delivery of the services relies on the agents in order for customers to access it; and if the 
standards and quality are not as expected utilisation of M – PESA would decline; negatively affect 
sustainability of services and introduction of other services on the platform. 
 
5.4.2 Vodacom Risk Perceptions 
The M – PESA Partnerships officials indicated that awareness and management of risk was a 
critical factor in the day to day operations of M – PESA. The officials’ views on risk were that the 




exposed to. The officials highlighted agent fraud as a major risk that they were constantly 
monitoring. Another risk cited was agents providing sub – standard services or not providing 
services at all. The officials noted that non – functioning of the M – PESA platform as a result of 
technical system failures was a risk that emanates from Vodacom. The officials’ view was that 
incidence of such actions can negatively affect M – PESA’s reputation as a service and brand as 
well as that of Vodacom as the company behind the service and brand. They further noted that such 
incidents had financial and legal consequences for Vodacom and the agents. 
 
5.4.3 Super – Agent Expectations  
The Super – Agents raised the following issues in relation to their goals for M – PESA: 
 The aim was to provide M – PESA services in order to increase their businesses’ overall 
revenue sources.  
 
 Supply of Vodacom airtime as a wholesaler resulted in considerable income for their 
businesses over time and the aim for M – PESA was to complement the existing airtime 
sales and in the end increase income for the businesses.  
 
 Some agents viewed Vodacom as a long standing partner and providing M – PESA services 
was to support Vodacom and continue the existing partnership.  
 
 Awareness of the expansion of digital payments and mobile money, the decision to provide 
M – PESA services was to keep up with the trends and remain relevant in the market.  
 
The Super – Agents’ views were that as ‘owners’ of the agent networks, a lot was expected from 
them by Vodacom and the agents under their management. The Super – Agents noted that their 
understanding of the expectations were a result of the responsibilities they had committed to as 
stipulated in the contract agreements. The Super – Agents’ expectations on Vodacom were that it 
had to regularly provide the necessary support, particularly training for their employees and ensure 
that the M – PESA system functions properly. The Super – Agents’ expectations on the Lower –
Tier Agents were that they adhere to the M – PESA service standards in particular managing the 







5.4.4 Super – Agent Risk Perceptions 
The Super – Agents’ perceptions were that the potential source of risk was actions of fraud and 
unethical behaviour at the Lower –Tier Agent level. They indicated that despite the existence of 
strong systems to detect and prevent fraud, there was a likelihood of fraud by shop assistants as 
well as customers. They indicated that it was their responsibility to ensure that such acts do not 
occur as they would have negative consequences on their businesses and relationship with 
Vodacom.  
 
5.4.5 Lower– Tier Agent Expectations  
Most of the Lower –Tier Agents interviewed indicated that their goal for providing M – PESA 
services was to gain more income for their businesses. They noted that they although M – PESA 
was not the principal service in their businesses, it was a source of revenue. The Lower – Tier 
Agents further noted that they considered existence of M – PESA services in their businesses and 
association with Vodacom as an advantage for status of the businesses. They indicated that this had 
potential to attract more customers to their businesses. Other agents, specifically those that were 
subsidiaries of Super – Agent companies indicated that they did not have views on the businesses’ 
goals for M – PESA as the parent company managed everything; but however noted that they 
regarded M – PESA as part of the day to day services provided by the businesses.  
 
The Lower – Tier Agents reported that they expected that M – PESA services would generate the 
anticipated income for their businesses because a lot of money had been invested to provide the 
services. Another expectation raised by the Lower –Tier Agents was that of continuous support by 
Vodacom and the Super – Agents particularly on training of employees and support in cash 
inventory management. The Lower – Tier Agents noted that they placed more expectations on the 
Super – Agents for support as they had recruited them and therefore had a responsibility to ensure 
that they were successful in providing M – PESA services.  
 
5.4.6 Lower – Tier Agent Risk Perceptions 
The risk perceptions raised by the Lower – Tier agents were within their own remit, and related to 
the actual provision of services. The main risk they alluded to was that of fraudulent actions that 
could be committed by shop assistants and customers. They noted that this was the main reason 
they expected support from the Super – Agents in order to prevent incidents of fraud and any losses 
resulting from them. The agents indicated that they were well aware of the consequences of the 
fraudulent activities which included suspension from the M – PESA network as well as reputational 




5.5 Agent Support and Monitoring and Performance 
The interview data was assessed to analyse any deviation from the prescribed service provision 
standards and requirements. In addition, the analysis assessed the effect of latent networks on the 
provision of M – PESA services.  
 
5.5.1 Agent Support and Monitoring  
Agent support through training and performance monitoring are crucial aspects of M – PESA 
operations that ensure agents adhere to service standards. These roles are undertaken by the M –
PESA Partnership officials and Super – Agent employees. The interviewees indicated that key 
aspects of agent support are training of shop assistants and owners or managers and rebalancing of 
cash and e – float. They however noted that not all Lower –Tier Agents required support in 
managing their cash and e – float requirements, in particular those with larger business operations. 
The Partnership officials indicated that there was mandatory initial training for every agent upon 
registration and refresher training provided at intervals of 2 to 3 times a year. According to the 
officials, the mandatory initial training focused on adhering to legal requirements of customer 
registration (in particular know your customer and anti – money laundering) and customer 
protection; conducting customer transactions; record keeping and reporting and rebalancing of cash 
and e – float.  
 
The Partnership Officials and Super – Agents indicated that the monitoring aspect required a lot of 
effort, especially conducting physical visits to Lower –Tier Agents. The interviewees indicated that 
the main reason for monitoring was to ensure that the Lower – Tier agents adhered to the prescribed 
standards for service provision. They indicated that the main issues they focused on during 
monitoring are: 
 Agent liquidity management: whether agents keep adequate amounts of e – float.  
 
 Record keeping: whether agents are recording customer and transactional information as 
required. 
 
 Branding merchandise: whether agents are displaying M – PESA branding material such 





The Partnership Officials noted that despite the level of effort required for monitoring, the M – 
PESA operation system was able to track and record transactions in real time and this enabled them 
to keep track and identify potential acts of fraud as well as immediate follow – up. 
 
Table 2 outlines challenges encountered in agent support and monitoring as indicated by M – PESA 




Table 2: Agent Support and Monitoring Challenges Encountered 
M – PESA Partnership Officials Super – Agents Lower – Tier Agents 
Frequency of follow – up training not happening as planned. 
Initially it was possible to provide follow – up training for 
agents 3 times a year, however due to the increase in number of 
agents the number of times to conduct refresher training in a 
year has decreased. More focus is placed on Super – Agent 
training to ensure that they provide training and support to 
Lower Tier - Agents regularly. 
Staff turnover at Lower – Tier Agent businesses requires re 
– training of shop assistants regularly. This is also linked with 
staff rotations that some businesses practice wherein shop 
assistants’ responsibilities are changes. This has implications 
on monitoring and training in that the assistant may not know 
where record books are kept or not entirely familiar with the 
processes, and therefore cause delays or require another field 
visit.  
Time demands for shop assistants presents a 
problem as they are employed for responsibilities 
other than M – PESA. Another related issue is the 
turnover rate of shop assistants which results in 
retraining requirements for new assistants or 
redeployed assistants.  
Staff changes in Super – Agent businesses have compelled 
frequent unplanned for re – training.   
Business owners and managers do not regularly participate 
in monitoring visits and training. They usually delegate shop 
assistance who are either new, cannot make decisions or not 
entirely familiar with the M – PESA function. This adds a 
burden to Super – Agent staff as they have to continuously 
remind owners and managers about their expectations for 
training and monitoring.  
Communication from Vodacom and Super – 
Agents about monitoring and field visits sometimes 
not clear and not provided on time and this creates 
confusion. However some agents indicated that the 
problem emanates from within their businesses 
because shop assistants don’t pass on the messages 
to them as they are supposed to. 
Reluctance by businesses to release shop assistants for 
training sessions as well as delays in confirming their 
attendance.  
Unintended costs for shop assistants’ travel to 
attend training.   
Record books sometimes not available in – store, this usually 
occurs with businesses directly managed by the owner and 
records are kept where staff cannot access them.    
 
The large number of Lower – Tier Agents under the 
management of each Super – Agent makes it difficult to 
effectively manage, support and service them as expected. 
Undertaking physical visits to all Lower – Tier Agents was 




The issues indicated by two stakeholder categories (Partnership Officials and Super – Agents) have 
consensus that agent support and monitoring challenges encountered largely emanate from the 
issues related to shop assistants employed by agents and the high numbers of Lower – Tier Agents 
to be supported. Some Lower – Tier Agents also concurred with this observation, however to a 
certain extent. The Lower – Tier agents’ views on challenges differ from those of the Partnership 
Officials and Super – Agents and indicate existence of reluctance on their part to allow shop 
assistants to participate fully in agent support activities. From the challenges outlined, a lot of the 
agent support and monitoring burden in terms of time and cost is carried by the Super – Agents. 
Feedback on agent adherence to the prescribed standards by the agents is presented in the next 
section on agent performance.   
 
5.5.2 Agent Performance  
The analysis of agent performance at all levels was based on the main issues assessed during 
monitoring and agent support functions. Focus of the analysis was on the non – adherence of agents 
to prescribed standards of service provision. Other elements important for overall performance of 
the M – PESA network were also included in the analysis. Table 3 below depicts the findings from 
the analysis. 
 
Table 3: Adherence to Performance Standards 
Performance Standard Super Agents Lower Tier Agents 
Liquidity Management (whether 
agents keep adequate amounts of e – 
float and cash)  
Generally, agents at this level adhere to 
this rule mainly due to rebalancing 
responsibilities for Lower – Tier Agents 
under their management. Super – agent 
practice is to have e – float and cash 
inventories that are above the required 
levels because Lower – Tier Agent 
rebalancing requirements can 
sometimes be unpredictable. Initially at 
M – PESA introduction there were 
instances where some Super – Agents 
did not maintain the required e – float 
and cash balances.   
The majority of Lower – Tier Agents do 
not keep e – float and cash inventory 
levels as prescribed mainly due to the 
unpredictable nature of customer demand. 
Inventory levels are usually lower and 
only increased during identified peak 
times such as month end and weekends.  
Record Keeping  (whether agents are 
recording customer and transactional 
information as required) 
100% adherence to record keeping 
requirements. However, common for 
delays in reconciling own information 
with that from Lower – Tier Agents 




Several problems with record keeping – 
transactions not immediately recorded in 
log books; errors in recording transactions 
(e.g. figure entered in log book not the 
same as figure on system); double 
recording – transactions and customer 






books; delays in updating log book 
information and reports etc. 
Branding Merchandise (whether 
agents are displaying M – PESA 
branding material such as agent 
number and tariff information as 
required) 
Not all Super – Agents adhere to these 
standards. Agent number is usually 
displayed visibly, however in most of 
the agent premises the M – PESA tariff 
information is not displayed at all or 
displayed in an area where customers 
cannot clearly see it.  
M – PESA brand name and agent number 
are visibly displayed in all agent 
premises. Tariff information not 
displayed as required in most of the 
outlets.  
System Outage/Down time: 
(frequency of M – PESA system not 
accessible/not operational) 
Incidents of system outages usually 
occur once a week. In this case this is 
when the system is completely offline 
but network coverage available. Other 
problems are when the system is slow 
and when network coverage is 
completely not available, and these 
occur regularly for short periods of time.  
Incidents of system outages usually occur 
once a week. In this case this is when the 
system is completely offline but network 
coverage available. Other problems are 
when the system is slow and when 
network coverage is completely not 
available, and these occur for short 
periods of time.  
Equipment (availability and 
functionality of dedicated computers 
and cell phones to conduct 
transactions)   
All equipment requirements are 100% 
met by Super – Agents.  
Issues of non – adherence encountered 
mainly relate to availability and 
functional condition of cell phones 
dedicated for M – PESA. Common issues 
include cell phones off due to depleted 
batteries, cracked screens, ruined key 
pads etc.  
 
 
The agents indicated the following reasons for non – adherence to the prescribed standards: 
 Liquidity Management: the agents indicated that they were unable to adhere to the required 
levels because customer transaction demand was unpredictable. Another reason noted by the 
agents was that due to increased number of agents, competition had increased and as a result 
transactions had decreased since customers were accessing services from other agents. 
Therefore, it was not to their benefit to keep e – float and cash inventories at required levels. 
Other agents indicated that during periods of few transactions they had on occasion diverted M 
– PESA cash they held to expenditure related to their core business and at a later stage return 
the cash. Some agents also indicated that at times the inventories were not at required levels 
due to delays in rebalancing either because shop assistants or managers were busy to do it, not 
informing the Super – Agent on time and delays by the Super – Agent to assist.  
 
 Record keeping: the main reason for transgression was indicated as human error and 
negligence, in particular by the shop assistants. The agents further noted that this maybe a result 
of several factors such as lack of concentration due to undertaking other core business functions 




especially when there are many customers and shop assistants usually postpone filling the log 
books until later; shop assistants not properly trained as well as delegation of duties to a shop 
assistant without any training at all.   
 
 Branding merchandise: the interviewees’ reasons for non – adherence were that space was 
limited on their premises and therefore they could not exclusively give display priority to M – 
PESA over the core business needs for advertising space. Another reason alluded to was that 
overtime the M – PESA displays had worn out and had not been replaced. 
 
 Equipment: The Lower – Tier Agents indicated that the issue of cell phones was a problem 
mainly because of their negligent use by shop assistant. They noted that the cell phones were 
specifically purchased for M – PESA but because of negligence by shop assistants and use by 
different people, it was difficult to ensure that they were not damaged. Some also indicated that 
they had purchased the phones more than once and were not willing to incur further costs on 
them.  
 
 System Outage/Down time: The M – PESA Partnership officials seemed to be sensitive to this 
issue, however they indicated that the outages usually occurred when system upgrades were 
made and that agents were always informed when such work was to be undertaken. They did 
however accept that there were instances when the system did not function properly because of 
network technical problems. Most of the agents indicated that system outages and network 
problems were a regular occurrence and resulted in customers being turned away as they could 
conduct any transactions.  
 
Vodacom has put in place measures to address transgressions by agents that include total 
suspension from the agent network, charging a penalty and withholding of commissions. In relation 
to implementation of these recourse measures on transgressors the M – PESA Partnership Officials 
indicated that strong recourse measures were not applied frequently and cited one Super – Agent 
that was suspended from the network as an example of a tough action taken. The officials noted 
that the majority of transgressions occurred at the Lower – Tier Agents’ level, and due to their high 
numbers it was not always possible to immediately detect such actions. They indicated that it was 
not easy to enforce the severe measures for non – adherence as there were various reasons for such 
happening and at times not caused directly by the agents; and they considered possible enrolment 
of suspended agents by the rival mobile money service provider. They however expected that the 




officials indicated that measures such as re training are usually taken to support the agents to 
address the problems and improve the service. 
 
Table 4 illustrates a summary of the main issues emanating from the analysis of findings and is 
based on the following analytical framework presented in Chapter 3: 
1. Network Structure and Relationship Dynamics 
2. Agent Selection and Recruitment 





Table 4: Summary of Key Issues and Findings 




 Unlimited number of Lower – Tier Agents 
(LTAs) per Super – Agent (SA) increases the 
burden of management resulting in 
inconsistencies in support to Lower – Tier 
Agents across the sub – networks.  
 Agent heterogeneity: LTAs capacities differ 
and those with limited capacity are likely to be 
sources of vulnerability and risk within the 
network. 
 All agents are aware of the risks and their 
implications, however; 
 Risk allocation is unevenly distributed with 
SAs assuming more risk, especially those that 
have put up cash investments for their 
subsidiary businesses and some independent 
businesses.  
 Communication challenges within SA sub – 
networks create potential vulnerabilities and 
risk pre – conditions.  
 All the agents manage their own core 
businesses, no business dedicated to solely 
providing M – PESA services. This 
demonstrates existence and dominance of latent 
networks. 
 Agent sub – networks are largely built on 
existing relationships started prior to 
introduction of M – PESA. These relationships 
can either be an advantage to minimize M – 
PESA’s exposure to latent network 
vulnerabilities OR increase its exposure to such 
vulnerabilities.  
 Existence of the latent networks a precondition 
for quality fade in M – PESA services, 
particularly at the LTAs level.     
 Risk pre – conditions exist within SA sub – 
networks as a result of vulnerabilities from: 
o varying agent capacity 
o burden of management and risk on SAs 
o communication challenges  
 
 Latent networks a dominant feature of the M – 
PESA service delivery network. 
 
 Existent latent networks and the risk pre – 
conditions interact to create a situation of 
vulnerabilities that can result in quality fade in 
M – PESA services. 

















 Clearly stipulated requirements and processes 
for agent recruitment, as well as effective due 
diligence system limits potential for 
recruitment of agents that do not qualify; 
however  
 Minor signals of potential information 
asymmetry evident from reluctance by some 
LTAs to provide required financial 
information.   
 Capital investments paid by SAs on behalf of 
LTAs under their management create potential 
risk pre – conditions and goal conflict as the 
LTAs do not carry exposure to risk on any 
investment, and do not directly benefit from 
any incentives gained OR the SAs receive a 
greater portion of commissions where 
 Challenges encountered during agent 
recruitment are indications of possible 
vulnerabilities that can arise post – registration, 
and result in quality fade.  
 Some SAs’ recruitment of LTAs is mainly based 
on existing relationships started prior to 
introduction of M – PESA. These relationships 
can either be an advantage to minimize M – 
PESA’s exposure to latent network 
vulnerabilities OR increase its exposure to such 
vulnerabilities. AND  
 There is potential for hidden information from 
Vodacom as SAs recruit LTAs without 
Vodacom’s direct involvement. 
 Capital investment and branding requirements 
affect or compete with the agents’ core business 
and vice versa.  
 Despite challenges encountered in agent 
recruitment, there is no evidence of deviation 
from agent recruitment criteria and 
requirements.  
 Vodacom and Super – Agents share common 
motivation for M – PESA, namely profit and 
reputation for the brand and own businesses, 
indicating limited or no goal conflict.  
 SAs and LTAs also share a profit and 
reputational motive, however the SAs 
motivation is higher due to the multiple agents 
it manages – the more LTAs, the more 
commissions, transaction costs and risks.  
 However, existence of latent networks in the 
form of core businesses can potentially offset 







investments are put up for independent LTA 
businesses.  
 All agents clearly understand their 
obligations, risk exposure and recourse on any 
transgressions to contractual obligations.  
 Vodacom does not have any third party 
agreement with the Lower – Tier Agents, only 
has agreement with Super – Agents. This 
presents potential vulnerabilities and risk 
exposure for Vodacom as it relies on entities it 
does not have direct relationship with to 
provide services on its behalf. 
  There are indications of possible vulnerabilities 
that can arise post – registration, and result in 
vulnerabilities that can result in quality fade. 
 Without any direct formal agreement with 
Vodacom, Lower – Tier Agents may not feel 
compelled to adhere to service provision 
standards of M – PESA. Lower – Tier agents are 
more obligated to adhering to any prescribed 
standards of their core businesses. 
 Absence of third party agreements between 
Vodacom and Lower – Tier Agents 
demonstrates the existence and influence of 
latent networks which may result in quality 
fade. 
Agent Performance   Expectations, responsibilities and obligations 
are not met or executed as expected. This is 
demonstrated by various challenges in 
providing support/training and monitoring. 
These challenges create vulnerabilities in the 
network and manifest as risk conditions.  
 There is evidence of transgressions of service 
delivery standards which (e.g. non – 
adherence to maintaining prescribed levels of 
e – float and cash inventories) demonstrates 
direct risk conditions/events, particularly at 
the Lower – Tier Agent level.  
 The transgressions are either caused by 
unintentional actions or deliberate decision – 
making based on operational requirements and 
core business demands and result in 
vulnerabilities. 
 Limited recourse/not implementing full 
penalties on transgressors by Vodacom creates 
vulnerabilities in the network.  
 Latent networks or core business takes 
precedence over quality. The latent networks 
present exogenous risks and competition to M – 
PESA and therefore vulnerabilities that can lead 
to quality fade in M – PESA services.  
 Quality fade inherent in M – PESA services due 
to non – adherence to required performance 
standards, limited recourse and non-
implementation of severe penalties.  
 System outages and network problems affecting 
service provision. 
 Variations in agent capacity, particularly at the 
Lower – Tier Agent level determines the extent 
to which latent networks can create 
vulnerabilities on M – PESA services. Agent 
capacity variations evident in levels of 
adherence to required standards as well as 
differences in the dimensions of variation such 
as size of the core business, number of 
registered and number of transactions.   
 Leniency of Vodacom on transgressing agents 
demonstrates that it is cognisant of the existence 
of latent networks and competition from Econet 
to lead the mobile payments market. 
 There is deviation from the service delivery 
standards, in particular at the Lower – Tier 
Agent level. However the deviations as 
vulnerabilities and risk events do not severely 
affect M – PESA services across a sub – 
network or whole network. This demonstrates 
the resilience of the agent network collectively 
against transgressions and latent networks.  
 Moral hazard is inherent in M – PESA services 
and manifests through latent network 
demands/core business demands; challenges to 
physically monitor all Lower – Tier Agents and 
unintentional actions or deliberate decision – 
making based on M – PESA operational 
requirements by agents.  
 Vodacom has limited control and authority over 
the businesses providing M – PESA services 
and relies heavily on Super – Agents to ensure 
performance is maintained at required levels.   
 Existence of moral hazard and latent networks 
can affect expansion of M – PESA value added 
services such as use of M – PESA for in – store 







The results indicate that agent heterogeneity within the M – PESA delivery network demonstrates 
different capacity levels of the agents, mainly at the Lower – Tier Agents level. The varying 
capacity levels characterize the ability of the Lower – Tier Agents to provide services within the 
prescribed standards and processes. This demonstrates that the M – PESA services are not 
provided at the same level of standards across the network, therefore demonstrating existence of 
vulnerabilities that result in quality fade.  
 
The results further demonstrate that interactions are predominantly between Super – Agents and 
Lower – Tier Agents mainly on initial registration and monitoring and performance. The findings 
indicate that there are specific challenges encountered in the interactions between the Super – 
Agents and Lower Tier Agents that affect the effective provision of services by the Lower – Tier 
Agents. The challenges identified relate to inability to physically monitor all Lower – Tier Agents, 
ineffective communication and high turnover of shop assistants. These challenges contribute to 
non – adherence of specified standards of service provision by Lower – Tier Agents. The findings 
also illustrate that the high number of Lower – Tier Agents managed by a single Super – Agent is 
a factor that prevents their effective management and monitoring. A related finding is that 
Vodacom does not have third party agreements with the Lower – Tier Agents but with Super – 
Agents only. This demonstrates that the burden of responsibility and risk is allocated on the Super 
– Agents who must ensure that the agents under their management effectively operate M – PESA 
services. 
 
The results indicate that there is no deviation to adherence to recruitment requirements by 
Vodacom and Super – Agents. However, the results show deviation from prescribed service 
provision requirements mainly by Lower – Tier Agents. The non – adherence by the Lower – Tier 
Agents signals risk events across the delivery network. Reasons for non – adherence are attributed 
to unintentional actions and intentional actions by the agents. The unintentional actions are 
associated to human error and intentional actions linked to prioritisation of core business 
requirements over M – PESA services. This demonstrates the existence and influence of moral 
hazard and latent networks over M – PESA services.         
 
The secondary transactional data reveals a growth in provision of the services by the agents despite 




number of transactions conducted, number of Lower – Tier Agents recruited and e – float 



























 6. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research objective was to identify principle agent problem vulnerabilities in the mobile money 
service delivery structure and how the vulnerabilities are likely to affect availability and access to 
mobile money services. Specifically, the research focused on investigating the following two 
research questions: (a) How and to what extent does the principal – agent problem manifest 
itself in the mobile money service delivery network? (b) What are the implications of the 
principal – agent problem on availability and access to mobile money services? This chapter 
presents a discussion on the key findings in relation to the research questions under investigation, 
and conclusions.  
 
6.1 Findings 
Two channels through which the principal agent problem could permeate the M – PESA delivery 
network were identified as (a) at the point of agent recruitment by the principal into the network 
and (b) within the network as part of service provision by agents and management of the network 
by the principal. 
 
In the first instance of agent recruitment the principal agent problem is in the form of adverse 
selection and as noted by Rauchhaus (2009) arises from uncertainty concerning an agent’s 
preferences prior to creating a contract. The extent of adverse selection in the M – PESA delivery 
network is very low as a result of factors such as strict adherence to the agent recruitment criteria 
and processes stipulated by Vodacom, agents ‘understanding of their obligations and risks and 
common goal of profit making by agents. However, despite the limited extent of adverse selection, 
the challenges encountered during agent recruitment create latent risk pre – conditions which can 
result in vulnerabilities in the delivery network post registration. These challenges can be 
interpreted as modes through which the principal agent vulnerabilities can permeate the delivery 
network during agent recruitment. 
 
In relation to the second channel of permeation, the principal agent problem manifests as moral 
hazard, and as indicated by Rauchhaus (2009) moral hazard occurs when a principal is unable to 
observe an agent’s behaviour once the contract is in place. This situation according to Eisenhardt 
(1989) occurs because it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is 
actually doing. The research findings on moral hazard are from the perspective of agent 
performance on whether they adhere to the M – PESA performance standards prescribed by 




quality levels with respect to product and/or service requirements as indicated by Roh and Whipple 
(2010). Challenges to effective monitoring and support can be viewed as a channel through which 
moral hazard manifests in the M – PESA delivery network, and is in line with the definition by 
Eisenhardt (1989). The inability of Super – Agents to monitor all Lower – Tier Agents’ actions 
regularly and the deviation by Lower – Tier Agents from prescribed standards demonstrate how 
moral hazard permeates the M – PESA network.  
 
The existence and influence of latent networks in the form of the agents’ core business activities 
was identified. This demonstrates that latent networks are a channel through which moral hazard 
enters the M – PESA network and confirms the assertion made by Cheng and Kam (2008) that 
agents may alter specifications imposed on it, depending on risk taking profile and potential 
responsibilities to fulfil other commitments external to the observed network.   
 
The deviations from prescribed service standards particularly at the Lower – Tier Agent level can 
be perceived as quality fade risk events occurring across the M – PESA delivery network. These 
risk events, including risk factors posed by latent networks propagate across the delivery network. 
The sum of these risks overtime has the potential to result in negative implications for future M – 
PESA value added services such as use of M – PESA for in – store purchases and bulk distribution 
payments such as salaries and social grants. Such services require extensive monitoring and 
training to ensure that there are no deviations from prescribed standards of service provision. The 
existence of the latent network effects and deviations from prescribed standards can inhibit the 
potential of effectiveness of agent interoperability because the demand on time and effort on agents 
is likely to increase. Agent interoperability can be viewed as a solution to some of the challenges 
identified such as limited training and monitoring. In this case mobile money service providers 
can share investment costs in monitoring and training.  
 
Despite the identification of the existence of moral hazard, agents continue to invest in and provide 
mobile money services. Agents’ cash investments in mobile money, commissions or incentives 
and cognizance of reputational risk have been identified as factors that potentially limit the effects 
of the principal – agent problem in mobile money. The vulnerabilities related to moral hazard have 





6.2 Recommendations  
Despite the limited effects of the principal – agent problem on mobile money services, there are 
challenges and vulnerabilities that are likely to affect access and availability of the services. The 
recommendations provided below serve to inform policy to improve the services, address 
challenges and mitigate potential risks identified. 
 
1. The identified future potential vulnerabilities and risks require MNOs and agent enterprises to 
institute stronger partnership arrangements that enhance ownership and obligations for all 
parties, in particular agent enterprises. These agreements must enable the application of 
different mobile money delivery models that consider and are suitable to meet the demands 
and requirements of the agents’ core businesses.  
 
2. Regulators, MNOs and agent enterprises must collectively review the monitoring approaches 
for mobile money service providers in order to improve the effectiveness of monitoring. This 
review should be undertaken in conjunction with the review of service provision standards to 
enable them to be suitable to the various business environments the services are provided 
within.  
 
3. Mobile network operators (MNO) should use dedicated mobile money agents to reduce the 
influences of latent networks that can result in deterioration of services. This should be 
undertaken in conjunction with review of the commission structures to ensure that the 
dedicated mobile money agents have viable sustainable businesses.  
 
4. Mobile network operators adopt agent interoperability using one float and transactional record 
system to reduce the risks and workload of agents. Agent interoperability can potentially curb 
deviations from prescribed standards due to reduction in the workload, and assist agents to 
manage the fluctuations in customer demands at particular periods. The benefit of 
interoperability as indicated by Bourneau and Hoernig (2016) is that it can result in reduction 
in the number of agents, and lead to effective monitoring and management through cost sharing 
by MNOs. Fewer agents can result in frequent interaction with the MNO and likely curtail 
information asymmetry.  
 
5. Mobile network operators should introduce innovations mobile money that reduce the 
administration burden on agents. MNOs should consider rolling out point of sale (POS) 
applications using systems such as Near Field Communication (NFC) on the mobile money 




agents to reduce the burden of the current parallel systems. Such applications must consider 
the cost implications of adoption from the agents’ business perspective.  
 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
1. This research study focused on one specific mobile money delivery model i.e. M – PESA. 
There is need for similar research to be undertaken that assesses the principal – agent problem 
in mobile money using other business models. Such research can also assess the various mobile 
money business models and compare their strengths and vulnerabilities from a principal – 
agent problem perspective. This can enable comparable understanding of the dynamics of the 
principal – agent problem in various mobile money business models.  
 
2. Mobile money offerings have multiple stakeholders involved in its supply to customers. This 
research did not include all stakeholders including customers. Future research should assess 
the principal agent problem and include all stakeholders involved in the supply side such as 
regulators and the demand side, mainly customers. 
 
3. This research identified that agents had registered a large number of customers to the mobile 
money service. However, the number of users was lower than that of registered customers by 
more than half. Research can be conducted to investigate the reasons for the high number of 
registered customers and lower number of actual users.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter offered a key summary of the study findings, recommendations and future research 
areas. The conclusions were constructed from the primary data results of the preceding chapter, 
which highlighted the channels of the principal – agent problem, levels of penetration of moral 
hazard, challenges associated with monitoring and latent network effects, quality fade risks and 
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Appendix A: Mobile Money Implementation Models 
 
 






































Appendix B: Interview Guideline 
 
Main Research Questions 
 How and to what extent does the principal – agent problem manifest itself in the mobile money service 
delivery network? 
 
 What are the implications of the principal – agent problem on availability and access to mobile money 
services? 
Questions to Vodacom Officials 
Adverse Selection and Goal Conflict 
 How are M – PESA agents recruited (super agents and lower tier agents)? What are the criteria used to select 
an agent?  
 Have there been any changes made to the agent selection criteria since introduction of M – PESA? If yes, 
why? 
 How does Vodacom ensure that agents registered by super – agents meet all requirements/criteria?   
 How long does it take for an agent to be fully registered as an M – PESA service provider? 
 Is there a contract signed between Vodacom and Super Agents, and a contract signed by super agents and 
agents? What are the terms and conditions of each contract? 
 In your view do the agents fully understand the terms and conditions of the contracts?  
 What are the key determinants of agents’ commission structure? Have there been any adjustments made on the 
commission structure since M – PESA was introduced? If yes, why were adjustments made?  
Moral Hazard and Structural and Relationship Dynamics 
 What type of support is provided to agents – e.g. marketing, training, branding etc? How often is such support 
provided? Who provides such support?  
 Are there any registered M – PESA agents that are dormant or have not provided services at all? If yes, why? 
What measures has Vodacom take on such agents?  
 Does Vodacom directly communicate with all M – PESA agents? If yes, what are the communication channels 
used?  
 What are the major challenges and risks emanating from the agents? How does Vodacom address/manage the 
challenges and risks?  
 In general how would you describe the working relationship with all agents? 
Moral Hazard and Latent Networks 
 Are there any targets set for agents such as number of customers, transactions, number of agents per super – 
agent etc? If yes, why have such targets been set? What measures are taken if targets are not met?  
 How is agents’ performance monitored? What are the key elements assessed in monitoring? 
 How do you ensure that agents adhere to contract terms and conditions/performance standards? 
 What are the major challenges faced by agents in adhering to terms and conditions/performance 
standards/providing M – PESA services? 
 Which are the main/common transgressions by agents? What measures are taken to address such 
transgressions?  
 What are risks that M – PESA agents are exposed to and what role does Vodacom play to ensure that agents 
manage such risks? 
 Have there been instances where agents could not temporarily provide any M – PESA services? If yes, how 
frequent has this occurred and what were the reasons? What measures have been taken to ensure that such 
incidents do not occur? 
 Have there been instances where M – PESA agents have entirely stopped providing services? If yes, what 
were the reasons? 
 Which is the most common service provided by agents on the M – PESA platform? Which service is not being 
provided by agents as expected? If there is such, why? 
 What processes are followed in instances where an agent decides to cease providing M – PESA services?  
Questions to Super Agents1 
Adverse Selection and Goal Conflict 
 Is there a contract signed between you and agents? What are the terms and conditions of each contract? 
 In your view do the agents fully understand the terms and conditions of the contracts?  
 What type of support is provided to you by Vodacom? How often is such support provided?  
                                                 




 What type of support do you provide to the agents under your management? 
 Are there any registered agents under your management that are dormant or have not provided services at all? 
If yes, why? What measures have you taken on such agents?  
 What are the major challenges and risks emanating from the agents? How do you address/manage the 
challenges and risks?  
 In general how would you describe the working relationship with the agents under your management? 
Questions to Lower Tier Agents 
Adverse Selection and Goal Conflict 
 How long have you been an M – PESA agent? 
 How did you know about M – PESA? What attracted/prompted you to join the M – PESA agent network? 
 What were the requirements for joining the M – PESA network as an agent? What is your view on the 
requirements and processes to register as an agent?  
 What was the Super Agent’s role in ensuring that you met all requirements?  
 Which requirements were most difficult to adhere to? Why was it difficult to meet the requirements? 
 How long did it take you to provide services after becoming an agent? 
 What is your view of the M – PESA incentives/commissions structure? Are you satisfied with the revenue you 
are generating from M – PESA transactions? If yes, why? If not, why?  
Structural and relationship dynamics 
 What type of support/training did you receive initially when you became an M – PESA agent?  
 Who provided the support or training? What are your views on the support/training provide?  
 What type of support does the Super – Agent provide to your M – PESA business?  
 What steps or actions does the Super – Agent take when you have not adhered to the performance 
standards/contract provisions?  
 How does this support enhance your services? Which areas of support should be improved and why?  
 In general how would you describe the working relationship with your Super – Agent?  
Moral Hazard and Latent Networks 
 How often does the Super – Agent undertake monitoring checks/visits? 
 What are the main issues that the SP checks or assesses during visits?  
 What are the performance standards you are expected to adhere to as an M – PESA agent?  
 Which is the most difficult to adhere to and why? Given the opportunity which standard would you change 
and why?  
 Have there been any adjustments made to the performance standards since you started providing services? If 
yes, what were the adjustments made and why were they made?  
 What risks are you exposed to as an M – PESA agent and how do you manage them? 
 Have there been instances when you could not provide any M – PESA services? How frequent has this 
occurred and what were the reasons?  
 In your view has provision of M – PESA services had any (positive or negative) effects on your core business? 
If yes how?  
 With the experience you have had in providing M – PESA services, would you have decided differently in 
joining? OR Would you recommend anyone to join?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
